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Abstract
The aim of my thesis is to investigate the effect of competition on financial interme-
diaries in light of the conflicts of interest and perverse incentive structures that exist in
the financial system.
The first chapter of my thesis, Credit Rating and Competition investigates the
conflict of interest arising from the issuer pay compensation model of the credit rating
industry using a theoretical model of competitive interaction. Rating agencies balance
the benefits of maintaining reputation (to increase profits in the future) and inflating
ratings today (to increase current profits). Our results suggest that, unless new entrants
have a higher reputation vis-a`-vis incumbents, rating agencies are more likely to inflate
ratings under competition relative to monopoly, resulting in lower expected welfare.
The second chapter, Market Frictions, Interbank Linkages and Excessive
Interconnections , studies banks’ decision to form financial interconnections. I develop
a model of financial contagion that explicitly takes into account the possibility of crisis.
This allows me to model the network formation decision as optimising behaviour of com-
petitive banks. I show that regulatory intervention in the form of deposit insurance and
more implicit too big to fail type perceptions of government guarantees creates a wedge
between social and private optimality. In the presence of these implicit and explicit guar-
antees, competitive banks find it optimal to form socially suboptimal interconnections in
equilibrium.
The final chapter, Competition, Premature Trading and Excess Volatility ,
attempts to explain the empirically observed excess asset price volatility as a consequence
of competitive interaction between market participants. Our model shows that in the
presence of competitive pressures, market participants find it optimal to act prematurely
on unverified, noisy information. This premature reaction leads to lower total profits,
excess market volatility and spike in volatility at the closing time of the market.
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Abstract
We develop a theoretical model to analyse the effect of competition on
the conflict of interest arising from the issuer pay compensation model of the
credit rating industry. We find that relative to monopoly, rating agencies are
more likely to inflate ratings under competition, resulting in lower expected
welfare. These results do not depend on the presence of ratings shopping as
in Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) and Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), but
instead focus on the trade-off between maintaining reputation (to increase
profits in the future) and inflating ratings today (to increase current profits).
Our results suggest that ongoing regulatory initiatives aimed at increasing
competition in the ratings industry may reduce overall welfare, unless new
entrants have a higher reputation via-a`-vis incumbents.
Keywords: Rating agencies, competition, reputation, repeated games, financial regulation
JEL Classifications: C73, D43, D82, D83, G24
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1 Introduction
The credit rating industry aims to offer investors valuable information about issuers
in need of financing. Due to the asymmetric information between the issuers and the
investors, credit ratings often have pivotal impacts on the issuers’ financing outcomes.
Before the 1970s, the rating agencies relied on an investor-pay model wherein investors
subscribed to ratings released by the agencies and these subscription revenues were the
main source of income for the rating agencies. However owing to the ‘public good’ nature
of ratings1 and the increase in free riding, rating agencies switched to the current issuer-
pay model and started charging issuers for ratings. As things stand today, the largest
source of income for the rating agencies2 are the fees paid by the issuers the rating
agencies are supposed to impartially rate.3 This tempts rating agencies to rate better
than what fundamentals suggest.
Such behaviour has been criticised heavily since the onset of the recent financial
crisis, in particularly over the AAA ratings that have been issued to complex structured
products. Rating agencies played a crucial role in the rapid growth of structured finance.
According to Fitch Ratings (2007), around 60% of all global structured products were
AAA-rated, compared to less than 1% for corporate and financial issues. Following a
subsequent jump in default rates, rating agencies lowered the credit ratings on structured
products widely, indicating that the initial ratings were likely inaccurate.
A number of empirical papers find that the conflicts of interest problem play an
important role in rating agencies’ decisions. Griffin and Tang (2011) give striking empir-
ical evidence of ratings inflation by rating agencies. They compare the CDO assumptions
made by the ratings department and by the surveillance department within the same rat-
ing agency, and find the former uses more favorable assumptions. Moreover, it appears
that the signals from the surveillance department were ignored and the CDOs favored by
the ratings department were subsequently downgraded. Xia and Strobl (2012) provide
1This was officially recognised by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the 1970s when
the big three rating agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch were designated self-regulatory
entities. See Lowenstein (2008).
2It is also interesting to note that rating agencies are some of the most profitable businesses. Moody’s
was the third most profitable company in the S&P 500-stock index from 2002 to 2007, based on pretax
margins (ahead of both Microsoft and Google).
3Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s Examinations of Select Credit Rating
Agencies by the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008, p.9.
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further evidence of ratings inflation as a result of the issuer-pay model. They compare
the ratings issued by Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services (S&P) which follows the issuer-
pay model to those issued by the Egan-Jones Rating Company (EJR) which adopts the
investor-pay model. They find that S&P inflates more relatively to EJR when S&P’s
conflict of interest is more acute.
It is often suggested that introducing more competition between rating agencies may
help alleviate the conflicts of interest problem. However, a growing body of academic
literature suggests that this may not be the case. Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) show
that, in the presence of asset complexity and ratings shopping, competition leads to lower
welfare in equilibrium. Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) also find that competition
leads to more ratings inflation as issuers are able to more easily shop for ratings and
that this effect is particular acute in boom times, when investors are more trusting. The
contribution of our paper is to show that even in the absence of ratings shopping and
asset complexity, and with rational investors, competition delivers lower welfare than
monopoly. Our results stem from the fact that enhanced competition in the form of
a new entrant reduces the incumbent’s market share for ratings. This market sharing
effect reduces the rent that rating agencies can derive from maintaining their reputation,
encouraging ratings inflation even in the absence of ratings shopping. Our results suggest
that current regulatory attempts to reduce ratings shopping4 may not eliminate ratings
inflation due to the underlying conflicts of interest problem.
We develop an infinite horizon model where rating agencies compete for market share
and face a trade-off between reputation and current fees. Competition in our model
has two effects - the disciplining effect and the market-sharing effect. Competition de-
creases ratings inflation through the disciplining effect as rating agencies have incentives
to maintain or gain the market leadership. This channel is generally emphasized when it
is argued that enhanced competition between rating agencies can resolve the conflict of
interest. However, this ignores the other effect of competition - the reward from main-
taining reputation is lower because competition implies that the market is shared between
a larger number of rating agencies. We call this the market-sharing effect and study the
impact of competition on the behaviour of rating agencies by exploring the interaction
4See Sangiorgi and Spatt (2011). Note that in a rational expectations setting, ratings inflation might
arise due to the possibility of unpublished ratings, which might be countered by regulation.
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between these two opposite effects. Our results suggest that on balance the latter effect
dominates and higher competition results in greater ratings inflation.
Given the structure of the market - with S&P’s and Moody’s having 80% of market
share,5 we model competition amongst the rating agencies in a duopolistic setting. In
our model, issuers need a good rating to finance their projects. Rating agencies, which
can be of two types - honest or strategic, perfectly observe the quality of the project
and can either give the issuer a good rating or refuse rating. An honest rating agency
always gives good ratings to good projects and no rating to bad projects while a strategic
rating agency acts to maximise its expected profits. Neither investors nor issuers know
for sure if a rating agency is honest and they Bayesian update on the reputation of the
rating agencies, i.e. the probability that a rating agency is honest. The market share
of the rating agency is modeled such that rating agencies with higher reputation attract
more projects. Hence the rating agencies face a trade-off between current income and
reputation which determines their future market share and income.
We compare the behaviour of rating agencies between the duopolistic case and the
monopolistic case.6 We first derive closed-form solutions in a three-period model and
show that the lax behaviour of a rating agency increases with the reputation of its
competitor, i.e. competition leads to more lax behaviour and the market-sharing effect
dominates. We then compute numerical solutions under an infinite-period setting, which
enables us to relax parameter restrictions and extend the horizon of rating agencies,
thereby making reputation more important for them.
Our results show that the market-sharing effect tends to dominate the disciplining
effect when the degree of competition is sufficiently high, i.e. the reputation of the
competitor is high. Moreover, we find that expected welfare is higher in the monopoly
case than in the duopoly case as long as the reputation of the entrant rating agency
(the competitor) is not greater than that of the incumbent rating agency. In our model,
expected welfare rises only when the new entrant has a higher reputation vis-a`-vis the
incumbent, a situation which appears unlikely. We verify that the results are robust
to different parameter specifications and on balance, our results suggest that increasing
5The figure stands at 95% if we include the third major player, Fitch.
6Although we only focus on competition in a duopolistic setting, our results intuitively extend to
situations with higher degrees of competition.
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competition is likely to result in more ratings inflation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section
3 outlines the basic features of our model and Section 4 describes the equilibrium. We
present the infinite horizon solution of our model in Section 5 and compare the behaviour
of rating agencies under monopoly and duopoly. This section also discusses the expected
welfare consequences of enhanced competition. Section 6 concludes. The proofs and
additional robustness checks, including a finite horizon analytical solution of our model
in a three-period setting, are presented in the Appendix.
2 Literature Review
Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) demonstrate that reputational concerns are
not enough to solve the conflict of interest problem. In equilibrium, rating agencies are
likely to behave laxly, i.e. rate bad projects as good and are prone to reputation cycles.
Our model innovates by introducing competition through an endogenous market share
function and studying how competition affects the behaviour of rating agencies.
Becker and Milbourn (2011) lends support to our results by providing an empirical
test of the impact of competition on rating agencies. They measure competition using
the growth of Fitch’s market share and find three pieces of evidence. First, the overall
standards of ratings issued by S&P and Moody’s increased (closer to the top AAA rating)
with competition, so that ratings became more ‘friendly’. Second, the correlation between
bond yields and ratings fell as competition increased, implying that ratings became less
informative. Third, equity prices started reacting more negatively to rating downgrades,
suggesting a lower bar for rating categories. Their findings are consistent with our results
that competition will tend to lower the quality of ratings in the market.
A recent paper by Xia (2012) provides some contrasting empirical evidence. The
author compares S&P’s rating quality before and after the entry of an investor paid rating
agency and finds a significant improvement in the quality of S&P’s ratings following the
entry of the new rating agency. This result however is completely compatible with our
model since an investor paid rating agency in our setting would be perfectly honest and
our results suggest that in cases in which the incumbent RA has lower reputation than
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the entrant RA, welfare improvement is possible.
There has been an extensive literature that studies competition through reputation.
For example, Horner (2002) shows that the incentive to maintain good reputation and
stay in the market can induce good firms to exert higher effort and try to distinguish
themselves from the bad ones. The adverse effects of competition on the building and
maintenance of reputation has been studied by Klein and Leﬄer (1981). They argue that
when faced with a choice between supplying high quality products or low quality ones,
firms would be induced to supply high quality products only when the expected value
of future income given a high reputation outweighs the short-run gain of lying. Bar-
Isaac (2003) points out that the overall effect of competition on reputational incentives
is ambiguous and may be non-monotonic, since increased competition can reduce the
discounted value of maintaining a high reputation on the one hand, but can also lead to
a more severe punishment for low reputation on the other. This intuition is very close to
ours, except that we use a richer framework in the context of credit rating agencies.
Bouvard and Levy (2009) examine the trade-off between reputation and profits of
rating agencies in a competitive setting and find that the threat of entry attenuates
reputational effects. Mariano (2012) models how reputational concerns change rating
agencies incentives to reveal private information. In a setting in which rating agencies
have access to private and public information, her results provide a mechanism in which
competition between rating agencies might inflate the ratings even in the absence of
conflicts of interest. Compared to the above, the innovation of our paper is to endogenise
the market share of rating agencies and to explore the welfare implications of competition.
Damiano, Hao, and Suen (2008) study how the rating scheme may affect the strategic
behaviour of rating agencies. They compare ratings inflation among centralised (all firms
are rated together) and decentralised (firms are rated separately) rating schemes. When
the quality of projects is weakly correlated, centralised rating dominates because decen-
tralised rating leads to lower ratings inflation. The reverse holds when the correlation is
strong. Sangiorgi, Sokobin, and Chester (2009) model and analyse the equilibrium struc-
ture of ratings reflected by ratings shopping. They interpret how the correlation between
different rating agencies’ models influence ratings shopping and bias. They also use se-
lection as an equilibrium interpretation for notching by a rival rating agency. Moreover,
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they show that a higher cost of obtaining indicative ratings lead to inflation in published
ratings, as they are obtained less frequently.
Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2010) study credit ratings on subprime
and Alt-A mortgage-backed-securities (MBS) deals issued between 2001 and 2007. Al-
though they find that the fraction of highly rated securities in each deal is decreasing in
mortgage credit risk, their results suggest a progressive decline in standards around the
MBS market peak between the start of 2005 and mid-2007.
White (2010) gives a historic overview of the market of the credit rating agencies and
suggest that the regulatory framework contributed to the subprime mortgage debacle and
associated financial crisis. They highlight how the major reliance of regulators on major
rating agencies propelled them to the centre of US bond markets and led the mistakes
by those rating agencies to have serious consequences for the financial sector.
Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011) explore how the labour market for analysts and their
incentives influence ratings accuracy. Motivated by the fact that rating analysts were
fleeing the rating agencies for better paid investment bank jobs, they build a 2 period
model in which analysts work for rating agencies in period 1 and can leave them to a
better paid investment bank in period 2. They show that ratings accuracy increases
with monitoring and also with investment bank profitability (as analysts train harder in
period 1), but it is non-monotonic in the probability of the analyst getting a job in the
investment bank.
Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2012) analyse how reputational concerns of rating agencies
vary over the business cycle. A rating agency is more likely to issue less-accurate ratings
in boom times, when income from fees is high, competition in the labour market for
analysts is tough, and default probabilities for the securities rated are low. They also
show that competition among the rating agencies delivers similar qualitative results.
However, competition is not the main focus of their paper and is modelled through an
exogenous function between the degree of competition and the fees received by rating
agencies.
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3 Model Setup
We consider a discrete time setting with 3 types of agents – the issuers, the rating
agencies (RA) and the investors. Each period, we have a new issuer 7 with a project that
requires financing. We assume that issuers do not have funds of their own and need to
obtain outside financing. The investors have funds and are willing to invest in the project
provided they are convinced that it is profitable to do so. The role of the RA in this
setting is to issue ratings that convince investors to provide financing.
More formally, each period we have one issuer that has a project which lasts for one
period. All projects have a fixed pay-off Φ if successful and 0 otherwise and require an
investment of X. We assume that the required investment X is uniformly distributed
over (a,b) and its realisation is observed by all agents. This ensures that we have a range
of projects with different returns - projects that require low investment have high return
and vice versa. We can get similar results if we assume fixed investment with uncertain
pay-off. The project is good with probability λ and bad with probability 1− λ, and λ is
independent of X. Good projects succeed with probability pG and fail with probability
(1− pG). Bad projects always fail.
We assume that a-priori projects are not worth financing without rating, i.e. λpGΦ ≤
X. Further, the RAs can perfectly observe the type of project at no cost. After observing
the type, the RA can either issue a good rating (GR) or no rating (NR). Note that we do
not distinguish between bad rating and NR and abstract away from a ratings scale. In
our setup, a good rating is one that allows the issuer to borrow from investors. It does
not matter if this rating is AAA or A or BBB or even C. As long as the rating allows
the firm to get financing, we consider it to be a GR. A bad rating in this setting will be
a rating which does not enable a project to get financing. This is the same outcome as
a NR and thus, a bad rating and NR are equivalent in our model.
The rating agency receives income I if it issues GR, and 0 otherwise.8 This assumption
arises from the conflict of interest in the ratings industry. Given the non-transparent
7New Issuer implies that it is a one shot game for the issuer and we rule out the possibility that
issuers try to maximise profits over multiple periods. This assumption also ensures that issuers have the
same belief as the investors about the reputation of the RAs. If we allow the same issuers to approach
the rating agencies in subsequent periods, then issuers will have more information than investors.
8This is a standard simplifying assumption in the literature. See Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet
(2009) and Skreta and Veldkamp (2009).
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nature of the market and the widespread use of negotiated ratings, issuers and RAs
routinely have negotiations and consultations before an official rating is issued. RAs,
as part of their day-to-day operations, give their clients ‘creative suggestions’ on how to
repackage their portfolios or projects in order to get better ratings. To quote former chief
of Moody’s, Tom McGuire9
“The banks pay only if [the rating agency] delivers the desired rating. . . If
Moody’s and a client bank don’t see eye-to-eye, the bank can either tweak
the numbers or try its luck with a competitor. . . ”
Following Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009), we assume that only the RA knows
the type of project. This simplyfying assumption can be motivated by the market for
structured products, for which RAs played a vital advisory role. For structured products,
RAs routinely advise issuers about the level of credit credit enhancment needed to obtain
a good rating.
We model two types of RAs - honest and strategic . An honest RA always issues a
GR to a good project and NR to a bad project while a strategic RA behaves strategically
to maximise its expected future profits. The strategic RA faces the following trade-off :
1. (Truthful) It can either be truthful and maintain its reputation, thus ensuring
profits in the future
2. (Lie) It can inflate ratings (give a good rating to a bad project) and get fees now,
at the cost of future profits
We consider a duopolistic setting of rating agencies.10 The type of the RA is chosen
ex ante by nature and is known only to the rating agency itself. The reputation of the
rating agency is defined as the probability that it is honest, denoted by qi, i ∈ {1, 2}.
The reputation evolves over time depending on the ratings and outcome of the projects.
The strategy of the RA is xi, the probability the RA issues a GR to a bad project.
11
9New York Times Magazine, Triple-A-Failure, April 27, 2008.
10Given the structure of the market, with Moody’s and S&P controlling nearly 80% of the market, we
believe that this is a reasonable approximation of reality.
11Note that in equilibrium the strategic RA will always issue GR to a good project (see section 4).
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The investors (and issuers) have some priors about the types of the RAs and they
Bayesian update on their beliefs. Firstly, investors and issuers take into account the rating
and update the reputation of the RA, before observing the outcome of the project. Given
prior reputation qt,
If RA issues GR, qGRt =
λqt
λ+ (1− qt)(1− λ)x < qt (1)
If not rated, qNt+1 =
qt
1− x(1− qt) > qt (2)
If the project is issued a good rating by the RA, the investors update their beliefs
after observing the outcome of the project.
If the project succeeds, qSt+1 =
λpGqt
λpGqt + λpG(1− qt) = qt (3)
If the project fails, qFt+1 =
λ(1− pG)qt
λ(1− pG)qt + [λ(1− pG) + (1− λ)x](1− qt) < qt (4)
We make the simplifying assumption that each issuer can only approach one RA
for rating. Therefore, our model considers ratings shopping only to the extent that the
issuer and the rating agency have negotiations before an official rating is issued. We do
not explicitly study multiple ratings and herd behaviour of the RAs. While these are
important issues that merit attention, they are not the focus of this paper. Here we
look at the competition for market share among rating agencies and show that ratings
inflation increases with competition.
Investors observe the rating decision and decide whether to invest. If they observe
a GR from a RA with reputation q, their subjective belief that the project will succeed
(using equation (1)) is given by
s(q, x) = qGRpG + (1− qGR) λpG
λ+ (1− λ)x
=
λq
λ+ (1− q)(1− λ)xpG +
(
1− λq
λ+ (1− q)(1− λ)x
)
λpG
λ+ (1− λ)x
=
λpG
λ+ (1− q)(1− λ)x (5)
Given the required investment level X, investors are willing to finance the project if and
18
only if X ≤ s(q, x)Φ, i.e. if the initial investment required for the project is no greater
than its expected pay-off. Without loss of generality, assume s(q1, x1) > s(q2, x2). We
have 3 cases:
1. If X is such that a good rating from either RA is enough, i.e X ≤ s(q, x)Φ for both
q1 and q2, the firm can approach either RA.
12 We assume that in this case the firm
will randomly choose one of the RAs, i.e. the project goes to both RAs with equal
probability.13
2. If s(q2, x2)Φ < X < s(q1, x1)Φ , i.e. only the high reputation RA can issue ratings
that can convince the investors to provide financing, hence the firm will go to RA1
and not RA2.
3. If X > s(q1, x1)Φ, the project does not get financed.
a
Φ
s2 s1
b
Φ
X
Φ
Market Share of RA1 Market Share of RA2
Figure 1: The Market for Ratings
Thus we get the following result as illustrated in Figure 1 -
Probability that a project comes to RA1 =
(s1 − s2) + 12
(
s2 − aΦ
)
b
Φ
− a
Φ
Probability that a project comes to RA2 =
1
2
(
s2 − aΦ
)
b
Φ
− a
Φ
We set (a, b) = (λpGΦ, pGΦ), because any project with X < λpGΦ does not need a
rating to be financed, and any project with X > pGΦ is never worth financing ex-ante.
The probability that a project comes to RA1 =
s1 − 12
(
s2 + λpG
)
pG(1− λ) (6)
The probability that a project comes to RA2 =
1
2
(
s2 − λpG
)
pG(1− λ) (7)
12We assume that the issuers are only paid when projects succeed. This implies that the issuers will
be indifferent between RAs (with different reputation) given that both can guarantee financing.
13Note that this is one of infinite many possible equilibria. Since the issuers are indifferent, we have
an equilibrium for all probabilities (α ∈ (0, 1)) of approaching a specific RA . We focus on the case where
α = 12 . Our qualitative results do not depend on the choice of α.
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Reputation plays a critical role in our model. The market share of the RAs depends on s,
and thus on reputation q. Since the income from giving a GR is constant (denoted by I),
the future profits of the RA will solely depend on its market share.14 Moreover, the RA
with a higher reputation enjoys additional benefits of being the market leader, because
it owns entirely the proportion of the market that cannot be rated by its competitor but
can be rated by itself, whereas its competitor can only share its market with the leader.
This creates incentives for RAs to maintain or gain the market leader position and hence
disciplines the RAs through competition.
We can now see that competition (modelled through market share) has two effects
on lax behaviour: the market-sharing effect and the disciplining effect. The market-
sharing effect refers to the fact that the RA finds lying and receiving income today more
attractive as its expected future income is shared with another RA, and the disciplining
effect refers to the fact that the RA finds lying less attractive in order to maintain/gain
the advantages of being a market leader. We will show later that the market-sharing
effect tends to dominate the disciplining effect and hence competition aggravates the lax
behaviour of RAs in general.
4 Equilibrium
Definition 1. The equilibrium in our model is a set of Markov Perfect strategies such
that, at each period t, the strategic RA always
(i) Gives a good rating to a good project.
(ii) Gives a good rating to a bad project with probability xt, where 0 ≤ xt ≤ 1.
We look for a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in the sense that the equilibrium is “mem-
oryless”, i.e. the strategy of the strategic RA only depends on the current reputation
of the two RAs. The equilibrium is also “symmetric”, as the strategy function of both
RAs (if they are both strategic) is the same. However, the RAs do not take actions
simultaneously.
Let RA1 be a strategic RA and let Vt(q1, q2) denote its discounted future profits,
14The assumption of fixed I allows us to cleanly model competition through market share but is not
critical to our results. All our results go through if we assume that the fee is increasing in reputation.
The plots are available upon request.
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Figure 2: Decision-tree for Strategic RA1
given its reputation q1 and its competitor’s reputation q2, and let δ be the discount rate.
The RA’s new reputation after it gives NR and the failure of a project following a GR
are denoted by qN1 and q
F
1 respectively. A successful project with a GR leaves the RA’s
reputation unchanged. Note that qF1 and q
N
1 are functions of the strategy of the RA and
its current reputation level. For notational simplicity, we suppress the time subscript of
these reputation-updating functions.
Figure 2 shows the decision tree of RA1. Suppose it is approached for rating. If the
project is good, RA1 gives it a GR and gets income I (see Proposition 2 below). On
the other hand, if the project is bad, RA1 strategically decides whether to give a GR
and get fees I or refuse rating. In case of NR, RA1’s reputation rises as it gets a larger
market share in the future. In case of a GR, RA1’s reputation falls if the project fails
and remains the same if it succeeds. This in turn determines the RA1’s expected future
income. A similar analysis applies if RA2 is approached for rating. In this case the fees
go to RA2 and RA1 is only indirectly affected through a change in RA2’s reputation.
Note that since RA1 does not know the type of RA2, it has to take into account the
possibility that RA2 is either honest or strategic.
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Vt(q1, q2) = P (RA1rates)
{
P (Good)
[
I + pGδVt+1(q1, q2) + (1− pG)δVt+1(qF1 , q2)
]
+ P (Bad)
[
x1(q1, q2)
(
I + δVt+1(q
F
1 , q2)
)
+
(
1− x1(q1, q2)
)
δVt+1(q
N
1 , q2)
]}
+ P (RA2rates)
{
P (Good)
[
pGδVt+1(q1, q2) + (1− pG)δVt+1(q1, qF2 )
]
+ P (Bad)
[
(1− q2)x2(q1, q2)δV (q1, qF2 ) +
[
q2 +
(
1− q2
)(
1− x2(q1, q2)
)]
δV (q1, q
N
2 )
]}
+ P (NotRated)δVt+1(q1, q2) (8)
The objective function of RA1 is to maximise Vt(q1, q2), the strategy being x1. Note that
RA1’s strategy is only effectual when it rates a bad project. In all other cases, RA1’s
strategy is inconsequential.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique x1, where 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1, given that Vt(q1, q2) is an
increasing function in q1.
Proof. See Appendix A.1
Intuitively, it is easy to see from equation (8) that Vt(q1, q2) is linear in x1. This
ensures that RA1’s maximisation problem has a unique solution.
Proposition 2. A strategic RA does not have incentives to give NR to a good project.
Proof. See Appendix A.2
Proposition 2 implies that a strategic RA always gives GR to a good project. This is
because it gets a lower pay-off if it deviates from this strategy and gives a NR to a good
project. The proposition follows directly from the pay-off structure of the RAs and the
beliefs.
Proposition 3. There exists a unique equilibrium as described in Definition 1.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 1 and 2.
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Corollary 1. Assume pG < 1. Then the equilibrium strategy of the strategic RA is
always positive, i.e. it inflates ratings with positive probability.
Proof. See Appendix A.3
Corollary 2. Suppose the model ends in period T. Then the equilibrium strategy of the
strategic RA is x = 1 at t = T − 1, T .
Proof. See Appendix A.4
5 Model Solution
We solve the model numerically in an infinite horizon setting. The numerical solution
is computed using backward induction, i.e. we first solve the model in the finite period
case, and then increase the number of periods so that the equilibrium strategy converges
to the infinite horizon solution. In the appendix, we present an analytical solution to the
model in a 3-period setting. Our key results continue to hold, but the analytical solution
requires additional simplyfying assumptions.
In an infinite period setting, Vt by itself is independent of t. Hence we suppress the
time subscript for notational simplicity. However, the reputations evolve over time as
investors (and issuers) update their beliefs. Let RA1 be the rating agency that behaves
strategically. Then, RA1’s value function takes the following form:
V (q1, q2) =
1
2
(
s1 − λpG
)
(1− λ)pG
{
λ
[
I + pGδV (q1, q2) + (1− pG)δV (qF1 , q2)
]
+
(1− λ)
[
x1(q1, q2)
(
I + δV (qF1 , q2)
)
+
(
1− x1(q1, q2)
)
δV (qN1 , q2)
]}
+
s2 − 12
(
s1 + λpG
)
(1− λ)pG
{
λ
[
pGδV (q1, q2) + (1− pG)δV (q1, qF2 )
]
+
(1− λ)
[
(1− q2)x2(q1, q2)δV (q1, qF2 ) +
[
q2 +
(
1− q2
)(
1− x2(q1, q2)
)]
δV (q1, q
N
2 )
]}
+
pG − s2
(1− λ)pG δV (q1, q2) (9)
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where for s(q1, x1) < s(q2, x2),
1
2
(
s1−λpG
)
(1−λ)pG is the probability that the issuer approaches
RA1 for rating,
s2− 12
(
s1+λpG
)
(1−λ)pG is the probability that the issuer approaches RA2 and
pG−s2
(1−λ)pG is the probability that the project is not rated by either RA. The expression for
s(q1, x1) ≥ s(q2, x2) is analogous.
We assume that the model ends at period T and solve the model backwards. We
know that the strategic RA will always lie at period T and T − 1 according to Corollary
2. For all t < T − 1, the strategy of the RA depends on its own and its competitors’
reputation. We solve for the equilibrium strategy of the RA described in Section 4. We
look at the pay-offs from lying and being honest and determine the strategy. As long
as I + Vt(q
F
1 , q2) > Vt(q
N
1 , q2) for xt = 1, RA1 will always choose to lie. Conversely,
if I + Vt(q
F
1 , q2) < Vt(q
N
1 , q2) for xt = 0, RA1 will always tell the truth. In all other
intermediate cases, there exists a unique xt s.t. I + Vt(q
F
1 , q2) = Vt(q
N
1 , q2) at which
RA1 is indifferent between lying or not. Hence we deduce inductively the equilibrium
strategies of RA1. As T goes to infinity, we approach the infinite horizon solution. Since
δ < 1, the Blackwell conditions are satisfied.
Using this procedure, we solve the model for various parameter values. At the first
instance, we solve the model for a monopolistic RA. Next, we introduce competition in
the form of RA2 and show that the additional competitive element is not sufficient to
discipline the RAs. Furthermore, our results show that competition will in fact increase
ratings inflation.
5.1 Monopolistic RA
First we consider the case where there is only one RA in the market. In order to
make RA1 a monopolist, we set the reputation of RA2 to 0.
Figure 3 plots the strategy of the monopolistic RA for parameters (λ, pG, δ) =
(0.5, 0.7, 0.9).15 We can clearly see the strategy of RA1 is ‘u-shaped’ in its reputation.
Intuitively, the RA’s strategy is determined by the trade-off between current fees and
15Note that we have chosen this set of parameters (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9) for the purpose of
illustration only, and verified that our results are robust to other parameter specifications, the plot of
which are available upon request. In particular, robustness checks of the main results (Section 5.3) are
presented in Appendix C.
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Figure 3: Strategy vs Reputation, Monopolistic RA (λ, pG, δ, q2) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 0)
expected future income. When its reputation is very low, the RA’s expected future
income is very small compared to current fees, hence it has little incentive to behave
honestly. When its reputation increases, the RA’s future income becomes larger while
current fees stay the same, the RA tends to lie less. However, when the RA’s reputation
is very high, the penalty for lying decreases, and the RA starts to lie more. The reason
that the penalty for lying decreases with reputation is that investors attribute project
failures to bad luck rather than lax behaviour when they believe that the RA is very
likely to be of the honest type.
Moreover, we can see from Figure 4 that the strategy of RA1 is increasing in λ but
decreasing in pG.
16 The intuition is that, the reputational penalty of lying depends on
how the investors update their beliefs. If projects are more likely to be good (higher
λ) or if good projects are more likely to fail (lower pG), then a failure is more likely to
be attributed to bad luck rather than lying. Anticipating this smaller cost of lying on
reputation, the RA would choose to lie more when λ increases or pG decreases.
16We have also verified that this result holds in the case of competitive RAs, the plots of which are
available upon request.
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Figure 4: Strategy vs Reputation for different values of λ and pG (δ = 0.9)
5.2 Competitive RA
We now look at the impact of competition on the behaviour of rating agencies by
introducing a second RA (RA2). Figure 5 plots the strategy of RA1 for parameter values
(λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9). Figures 6 and 7 show cross-sections of this figure, for different
values of q2 and q1 respectively.
Figure 5: Strategy vs Reputation, (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the reputation and strategy of RA1 for dif-
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ferent values of the competing RA2’s reputation. As we can see, the relationship between
the reputation and strategy of RA1 remains ‘u-shaped’ as in the monopolistic case. More-
over, as the reputation of RA2 increases, the reputation at which RA1 has minimum x1,
i.e. is least likely to lie, also increases. This is not surprising as the disciplining effect
is greatest when the reputation of the competing RA (RA2) is close to the reputation
of RA1. This is because when the RAs’ reputations are close, it is more likely that the
market leadership will change, resulting in more disciplined behaviour. Conversely, if the
two RAs have very different reputations, the disciplining effect is relatively weaker.
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Figure 6: Strategy vs Reputation, (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9), different values of q2
Moreover, as Figure 7 shows, the strategy of RA1 is initially decreasing with or flat
in RA2’s reputation, and then increasing. This effect of competition is a combination of
the disciplining effect and the market-sharing effect. The disciplining effect is strongest
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Figure 7: Strategy vs Reputation, different values of q1, (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
when the two RA’s reputations are close, and weakest when the two RA’s reputations are
far apart, which implies that the probability of a change of market leader is very small.
On the other hand, the market-sharing effect is always increasing in the competing RA’s
reputation. When the reputation of RA2 is low, the market-sharing effect is very small
as RA2 can only take away a tiny fraction of market share. As RA2’s reputation starts
to increase, RA1 tends to lie less as the disciplining effect dominates the market-sharing
effect. However, when RA2’s reputation goes beyond a certain level, the market-sharing
effect dominates as RA2’s reputation becomes much higher than RA1’s. Hence RA1 will
lie more for high values of RA2’s reputation, due to the dominance of the market-sharing
effect.
Figures 8 and 9 show the expected profits of RA1 as a function of RA1 and RA2’s
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reputation. We can clearly see that the expected profits of RA1 are increasing in its own
reputation, and decreasing in its competitor’s reputation, illustrating the market-sharing
effect.
Figure 8: Expected Profits vs Reputation, (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
Finally, Figure 10 shows the convergence dynamics. It plots the change in RA1’s
strategy as the number of periods remaining increases. Reputation becomes less and
less important as the number of periods remaining declines since there are fewer periods
to reap the benefits of higher reputation. Thus ratings inflation increases. Note that
as the number of periods remaining increases, the strategy converges, implying that we
approach a long (infinite) horizon equilibrium.
In summary, our results show that introducing competition in the form of a second
RA is not sufficient to discipline the RAs which always lie with positive probability in
equilibrium. We now show that competition will actually increase the lax behaviour of
RAs and reduce expected welfare.
5.3 Comparing Monopolistic and Competitive RA
It is often suggested that introducing more competition in the ratings industry can
alleviate the problem of improper incentives and ratings inflation. However, our results
show that competition is likely to worsen this situation and lead to more ratings inflation.
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Figure 9: Expected Profits vs Reputation, different values of q1 and q2, (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
Figure 11 compares the strategic behaviour of RA1 under no competition, i.e. mo-
nopolistic RA (q2 = 0), and under a competitive setting with different values of q2.
We observe that in most cases, RA1 is prone to greater ratings inflation relative to the
monopolistic RA.
As described before, the implication of competition can be divided into the market-
sharing effect and the disciplining effect. We can see that the market-sharing effect
dominates the disciplining effect (i.e. competition aggravates lax behaviour) in most
cases. The only case where competition may actually alleviate the lax behaviour of RA1
is when q2 is very low (as shown in Figure 11(a)). This is because the market-sharing
effect is weakest relative to the disciplining effect for low values of q2. Intuitively, the
disciplining effect only depends on the difference between q1 and q2, whereas the market-
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Figure 10: Convergence Dynamics of RA1
sharing effect increases with the absolute level of q2. Hence the market-sharing effect
tends to dominate the disciplining effect except for low values of q2.
In order to assess the overall impact of competition, we compute the expected increase
in lax behaviour of RA1 given its own reputation, assuming that the reputation of RA2 is
uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. A positive value of this measure means the overall effect
of enhanced competition on RA1 is to lie more (i.e inflate ratings more).
Excess Lax Behaviour of RA1 =
∫
q2∈[0,1]
x1(q1, q2) dq2 − x1(q1, 0) (10)
As shown in Figure 12, the expected increase in lax behaviour of RA1 is always
positive, indicating that competition will, in general, aggravate ratings inflation. This is
because a smaller market share will tend to reduce the reputational concerns of the RAs,
and this market-sharing effect outweighs the disciplining effect brought by competition.
Moreover, we can see that the expected increase in lax behaviour is increasing for low
values of RA1’s own reputation and decreasing for high values of RA1’s reputation. The
intuition is that, when the reputation of RA1 is low, the market share of RA1 is going to
shrink significantly after introducing RA2 and the market-sharing effect of competition
is strongest. However, when the reputation of RA1 is high, the impact of introducing
RA2 on RA1’s market share is small, hence the market-sharing effect becomes weaker
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Figure 11: Comparing Monopolistic and Competitive RA, (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
Solid line represents monopolistic RA while dashed line represents competitive RA with different values of q2
and RA1 will lie relatively less. We verify that the excess lax behaviour, as defined above,
is always positive for other values of λ and pG in Appendix C.1.
In addition, we measure the expected total welfare in both monopolistic and duopolis-
tic settings as defined below.
Expected Total Welfare = E(Project Payoff)− E(Financing Cost)
= P (RA1 rates)
(
λpGΦ− E(X)
(
λ+ (1− λ)(1− q1)x1
))
+ P (RA2 rates)
(
λpGΦ− E(X)
(
λ+ (1− λ)(1− q2)x2
))
32
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Reputation of RA1 (q1)
Ex
ce
ss
 la
x 
be
ha
vi
or
 d
ue
 to
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n
Figure 12: Excess Lax Behaviour of RA1 due to Competition, (λ, pG, δ)=(0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
Figure 13 compares the total welfare17 between the monopolistic case and the duopolis-
tic case where both RAs have the same reputation. We can see that if a new RA is
introduced with the same reputation as the incumbent RA, then the total welfare will
always decrease, due to the fact that both RAs are more likely to inflate ratings.
Moreover, when we compare in Figure 14, the expected total welfare between the
monopolistic case and the duopolistic case with fixed values of reputations of RA2, we
can see that introducing competition will always lead to lower total welfare as long as
the reputation of RA2 is lower than the reputation of RA1. However, total welfare
may increase if the entrant RA has a higher reputation than the incumbent. Overall,
this implies that competition is likely to adversely impact total welfare, unless we can
introduce a new RA with much higher reputation than the incumbent. We check the
robustness of this result for different values of λ and pG in Appendix C.2.
17We are computing the welfare in one period only because it does not depend on time.
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Figure 13: Expected Welfare - Competitor has same Reputation
Solid line represents monopoly while dashed line represents duopoly with q1 = q2
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Figure 14: Expected Welfare - Competitor has different Reputation
Solid line represents monopoly while dashed line represents duopoly for different values of q2
(λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9) 34
6 Conclusion
In this paper we show that competition can amplify ratings inflation and the lax
behaviour of rating agencies, reducing total welfare. This result has important policy
implications since it suggests that the most often cited solution to ratings inflation - en-
hanced competition in the ratings industry - is likely to render the situation worse. While
we acknowledge that in order to focus on the implications of competition in the credit
ratings industry, we have abstracted from other important issues such as herd behaviour,
multiple ratings, and the quality of the models used by rating agencies, we believe that
our results can serve as a baseline for evaluating the reform proposals currently being
discussed.
One of the key thrusts of recent regulatory action in the credit ratings space has
been to relax barriers to entry and enhance competition. In the US, the Securities and
Exchange Commission has relaxed some barriers to entry and allowed several new CRAs
in the US to obtain the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO)
status. The European Union (EU) has gone further and has introduced new requirements
as part of the proposed amendments to the EU Regulation on credit rating agencies, the
so called ‘CRA-III’. The new legislation seeks to place a cap on the market share of
each ratings agency and requires issuers to rotate credit rating agencies periodically (see
European Commission (2011) for details).
In the context of our model, the cap on the market share of rating agencies is likely to
incentivise RAs to inflate ratings when their market share is close to the cap since they
would no longer benefit from higher reputation. Furthermore, proposals to rotate RAs
would mean that RAs would be assured of a market share, irrespective of their reputation.
This would break the link between reputation and future income, thereby increasing
ratings inflation. More broadly, proposals aimed at artificially enhancing competition are
likely to exacerbate the market sharing effect, while doing little to increase the discipling
effect.
One of the key findings in our model is that unless the new entrant RA has a higher
reputation than the incumbent, increased competition is likely to adversely impact total
welfare. However, it is unlikely that a new entrant would have sufficiently high reputation
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(and hence market share) to challenge the incumbents. It is more plausible to believe that
the new entrants would start off as marginal players. Moreover, it is likely that under
the current issuer pay model, they will continue to remain marginal players as their low
reputation (and associated market share) would incentivise them to inflate ratings more
than the established RAs. Interestingly, anecdotal evidence suggests that ratings issued
by Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS), a relatively new player in the European
market, are significantly more lenient than those issued by the more established players.
In conjunction with related work on multiple ratings and herd behaviour in the credit
ratings industry, our results suggest that a fundamental reorganisation of the industry
may be required to align the incentives. The conflict of interest highlighted in our paper
is fundamental to the issuer-pay model and any meaningful attempt to resolve the conflict
would require a fundamental shift in the way rating agencies are compensated. Empirical
work by Xia and Strobl (2012) suggests that investor paid RAs can be a solution as they
are unlikely to be affected by the conflict of interest highlighted in this paper and can
have a discipling effect on the incumbent RAs. However, while an investor pay RAs can
be a solution, free riding on the part of investors could result in insufficient revenues
for such RAs, making it difficult for them to compete with the incumbents. Deb and
Murphy (2009) argue that although free riding is a problem, the increasing use of ratings
by institutions, coupled with the rise in the speed of information diffusion in the markets
over the last few decades could, with proper regulatory encouragement, ensure that there
are investors willing to subscribe to ratings issued by investor pay RAs.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
There exists a unique x1, where 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1, given that Vt(q1, q2) is an increasing
function in q1.
Proof. When the strategic RA (RA1) gets a bad project, it will get pay-off Ψ(lie) =
I + δVt(q
F
1 , q2) if it gives the project a GR, and Ψ(honest) = δVt(q
N
1 , q2) if it refuses
rating. Note that qF1 =
λ(1−pG)qt
λ(1−pG)+(1−λ)(1−q1)x1 and q
N
1 =
qt
1−x1(1−qt) , i.e. q
F
1 is decreasing in
x1 and q
N
1 is increasing in x1. Given that Vt(q1, q2) is increasing in q1, it is easy to see
that Ψ(lie) is decreasing in x1 and that Ψ(honest) is increasing in x1. Thus if we define
x1 such that
• x1 = 1 if Ψ(lie) ≥ Ψ(honest)
• x1 = 0 if Ψ(lie) ≤ Ψ(honest) for
• x1 = x∗1 such that 0 < x∗1 < 1 if Ψ(lie) = Ψ(honest)
it follows that x1 is well-defined and unique.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The strategic RA does not have incentives to give NR to a good project.
Proof. Suppose that the strategic RA (RA1) gets a good project and that its strategy is
x1. Let’s examine whether RA1 wants to deviate:
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• if x1 = 1, we have Ψ(lie) ≥ Ψ(honest), or I + δVt(qF1 , q2) ≥ δVt(qN1 , q2). If the
RA1 gives NR to the good project, it will get δVt(q
N
1 , q2), and I + pGδVt(q1, q2) +
(1 − pG)δVt(qF1 , q2) otherwise. Since I + pGδVt(q1, q2) + (1 − pG)δVt(qF1 , q2) ≥ I +
δVt(q
F
1 , q2) ≥ δVt(qN1 , q2), RA1 does not want to deviate.
• if x1 = 0, qN1 = qF1 = q1, hence reputation becomes irrelevant and the RA does not
have an incentive to give NR to the good project.
• if 0 < x1 < 1, we have Ψ(lie) = Ψ(honest), so I+pGδVt(q1, q2)+(1−pG)δVt(qF1 , q2) ≥
I + δVt(q
F
1 , q2) = δVt(q
N
1 , q2), and hence RA1 does not want to deviate.
Therefore RA1 does not have incentives to give NR to a good project.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Assume pG < 1. Then the equilibrium strategy of the strategic RA is always positive.
Proof. Suppose that the equilibrium strategy is x1 = 0. Then q
N
1 = q
F
1 = q1 and we
must have I + δVt(q1, q2) ≤ δVt(q1, q2). This is impossible as long as I > 0. Hence x1 = 0
cannot be an equilibrium strategy.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 2
Suppose the model ends in period T. Then the equilibrium strategy of the strategic RA
is xt = 1 at t = T − 1, T .
Proof. At t = T , the strategic RA does not have any reputational concerns. This implies
that the strategy of strategic RA will be to always give GR if the project is bad, i.e.
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xT = 1.
Similarly, at t = T − 1 the strategic RA will always lie. Suppose that a bad project
comes to strategic RA, say RA1. The expected pay-off of RA1 is
I + δVT−1(qF1 , q2) = I + f(q
F
1 , 1, q2, 1)δI (11)
if it lies, i.e. gives a good rating, and
δVT−1(qN1 , q2) = f(q
N
1 , 1, q2, 1)δI (12)
if it does not lie, i.e. gives no rating, where f(q1, x1, q2, x2) is the probability that the
project comes to RA1 in the next period. Using equations (5), (6) and (7) we have
• f(q1, x1, q2, x2) =
1
2
(
s(q1,x1)−λpG
)
pG(1−λ) if s(q1, x1) ≤ s(q2, x2)
• f(q1, x1, q2, x2) = s(q1,x1)−
1
2
(
s(q2,x2)+λpG
)
pG(1−λ) otherwise
where s(q, x) = λpG
λ+(1−q)(1−λ)x .
Although in this case RA1 does have reputational concerns, these are not sufficient to
prevent RA1 from being lax and not giving GR to bad projects. Since by being honest
RA1 is giving up I today, in exchange for having a higher chance of getting I in the next
period, it is not optimal for RA1 to be honest, given that RA1 is impatient (i.e. δ < 1).
Hence the optimal strategy of RA1 is to always lie, i.e. xT−1 = 1.
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B Finite Horizon Solution
We assume the model lasts for three periods, t = 1, 2, 3, and the RAs maximise their
expected total income over the three periods. As before, we compute the equilibrium
strategy of the RAs using backward induction. We already know that the strategic RA
will always lie in the last two periods, as shown in Corollary 2.
We solve for the equilibrium strategy at t = 1. Again, let’s look at the decision of
RA1. Since RA1 will always lie at t = 2, 3, the expected pay-off of RA1 at t = 1 is
Ψ(lie) = I + δV2(q
F
1 , q2) = I + δf(q
F
1 , 1, q2, 1)I
+ δ2
{
f(qF1 , 1, q2, 1)[λpGf(q
F
1 , 1, q2, 1) + ((1− pG)λ+ (1− λ))f(qFF1 , 1, q2, 1)]
+ f(q2, 1, q
F
1 , 1)[λpGf(q
F
1 , 1, q2, 1) +
(
λ(1− pG) + (1− λ)(1− q2)
)
f(qF1 , 1, q
F
2 , 1)
+ (1− λ)q2f(qF1 , 1, qN2 , 1)]
}
I (13)
if it lies, and
Ψ(honest) = δV2(q
N
1 , q2) = δf(q
N
1 , 1, q2, 1)I
+ δ2
{
f(qN1 , 1, q2, 1)[λpGf(q
N
1 , 1, q2, 1) + ((1− pG)λ+ (1− λ))f(qNF1 , 1, q2, 1)]
+ f(q2, 1, q
N
1 , 1)[λpGf(q
N
1 , 1, q2, 1) +
(
λ(1− pG) + (1− λ)(1− q2)
)
f(qN1 , 1, q
F
2 , 1)
+ (1− λ)q2f(qN1 , 1, qN2 , 1)]
}
I (14)
if it is honest, where f(q1, x1, q2, x2) is the probability that the project comes to RA1
next period, given its reputation q1, its strategy x1, its competitor’s reputation q2 and
its competitor’s strategy x2.
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As described in Section 4, we look for an equilibrium of the game by examining the
trade-off facing RA1, i.e. the difference between expressions (13) and (14). If the pay-
off from lying is greater then x1 = 1 and we have a pure-strategy equilibrium in which
RA1 always lies; if the pay-off from not lying is greater then x1 = 0 and we have a
pure-strategy equilibrium in which RA1 never lies; otherwise we have a mixed-strategy
equilibrium in which RA1 is indifferent between lying and not lying, given some prior
beliefs about its strategy, i.e. 0 < x1 < 1.
To derive an analytical solution to this game, we make a simplifying assumption that
pG = 1 and δ = 1. This assumption implies that the reputation of the strategic RA goes
to zero if it gives a GR to a bad project since now every good project succeeds and every
bad project fails. This simplifies expressions (13) and (14) and allows us to derive the
equilibrium strategy of RA1. This assumption is relaxed in Section 5.
The expression of market share of RA1 depends on whether RA1 has a higher prob-
ability of success than its competitor. Given that the strategy of the strategic RA in
the last two periods is to always lie, the RA with a higher reputation will have a higher
market share in any single period. Hence we compute the strategy of RA1 in different
ranges of the reputation of RA2.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium strategy at t = 1 assuming pG = 1 and δ = 1 is
x1 =

0 if A ≤ λq1
2
(
λq1+(1−q1)
)
1− (1−2A)λq1
2A(1−q1) if
λq1
2
(
λq1+(1−q1)
) < A < 1
2
1 if A ≥ 1
2
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where A is the solution to the equation
Ψ(lie)−Ψ(honest) = I − δ(2A−min{A,B})I − δ2
(
λ(2A−min{A,B})2+
(2B −min{A,B})[λ(2A−min{A,B}) + 2(1− λ)(1− q2)A+ (1− λ)q2A])I = 0
and B =
1
2
(
s(q2,1)−λpG
)
pG(1−λ) .
Furthermore, in equilibrium, x1 is decreasing in q1. Moreover, x1 is increasing in q2
using first order Taylor approximation.
Proof. Since pG = 1, the reputation of RA1 (i.e. the strategic RA) will go to zero if it
gives a GR to a bad project since now every good project succeeds and every bad project
fails. So the expected pay-off from giving a GR to a bad project is I. This simplifies
expressions (13) and (14) and allows us to derive RA1’s equilibrium strategy.
The expected pay-off from being honest is
Ψ(honest) = δf(qN1 , 1, q2, 1)I + δ
2
(
f(qN1 , 1, q2, 1)λf(q
N
1 , 1, q2, 1)
+f(q2, 1, q
N
1 , 1)[λf(q
N
1 , 1, q2, 1)+(1−λ)(1−q2)f(qN1 , 1, qF2 , 1)+(1−λ)q2f(qN1 , 1, qN2 , 1)]
)
I
Using equations (6) and (7) and noting that RA1 will always lie in periods t = 2, 3, this
can be rewritten as
Ψ(honest) = δ(2A−min{A,B})I + δ2
(
λ(2A−min{A,B})2
+ (2B −min{A,B})[λ(2A−min{A,B}) + 2(1− λ)(1− q2)A+ (1− λ)q2A]
)
I
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where A =
1
2
(
s(qN1 ,1)−λpG
)
pG(1−λ) and B =
1
2
(
s(q2,1)−λpG
)
pG(1−λ)
The expected pay-off from lying is I, since the RA’s reputation goes to zero
Ψ(lie) = I
We look for a equilibrium of the game by examining RA1’s trade-off between lying and
not lying. If the pay-off from lying is greater when x1 = 1, we have a pure-strategy
equilibrium in which RA1 always lies; if the pay-off from not lying is greater when
x1 = 0, we have a pure-strategy equilibrium in which RA1 never lies; otherwise we have
a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which RA1 is indifferent between lying or not given some
prior beliefs about its strategy, i.e. 0 < x1 < 1.
We now solve the equation Ψ(lie) − Ψ(honest) = 0. We do this in 2 stages. In the
first stage, we solve the equation in terms of A and then using the expression for A, we
solve for the equilibrium value of x1.
For A < B we have
Ψ(lie)−Ψ(honest) = δ2(1− λ)(2− q2)A2 −
(
δ + 2Bδ2λ+ 2Bδ2(1− λ)(2− q2)
)
A+ 1
Assuming δ = 1, the solution is
A = B +
1 + 2Bλ−√(1 + 2Bλ)2 + (1− λ)(2− q2)%
2(1− λ)(2− q2)
which is valid18 as long as % = B2
(
2− (1− λ)q2
)
+B − 1 > 0.
18i.e. A is real and less than B.
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Note that B can be simplified to
B =
λq2
2
(
1− q2(1− λ)
)
We can see that B is bounded above by 1
2
. Therefore % ≤ 0 and we can rule out the case
above.
Now for A ≥ B we have
Ψ(lie)−Ψ(honest) = −4δ2λA2 − (2δ − 2Bδ2λ+Bδ2(1− λ)(2− q2))A+ δB + 1
Assuming δ = 1, the solution is
A = B +
√(
2 + 6λB +B(1− λ)(2− q2)
)2 − 16λ%− (2 + 6λB +B(1− λ)(2− q2))
8λ
which is valid19 given % = B2
(
2− (1− λ)q2
)
+B − 1 ≤ 0.
Note that A can also be expressed as
A =
√(
2− 2λB +B(1− λ)(2− q2)
)2
+ 16λ(B + 1)− (2− 2λB +B(1− λ)(2− q2))
8λ
Applying first-order Taylor approximation20, we have
A ' B + 1
2− 2λB +B(1− λ)(2− q2) =
B + 1
2− 2λB + λq2
2
+B(1− 2λ)
19i.e. A is real and greater than B.
20That is,
√
N2 + d ' N + d2N .
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Substituting for B, the first order derivative of A with respect to q2 is
λ
(
(1− λ)(3λ− 2)q22 + 4(1− λ)q2 + 8λ
)
(
4− q2(4λ2 − 6λ+ 4)− λ(1− λ)q22
)2
It can be shown that the minimum of the above is proportional to −4(1−λ)
3λ−2 + 8λ and is
attained when q2 = − 23λ−2 . When λ < 23 , the minimum is always positive, hence A is in-
creasing in q2. When λ >
2
3
, the derivative reaches zero when q2 =
−4(1−λ)±
√(
16(1−λ)2−32λ(1−λ)(3λ−2)
2(1−λ)(3λ−2) ,
which is negative. Hence the minimum is positive for q2 > 0. Therefore A is always in-
creasing in q2.
Now we have shown that there always exists a solution which depends on the param-
eter %. Since A always has a solution, we can use it to find the equilibrium strategy x1
in terms of A, i.e. we will look for the value of x1 such that
1
2
(
s(qN1 ,1)−λpG
)
pG(1−λ) = A.
Note that assuming pG = 1 implies λpG = λ. Using this and equation (5), the above
expression can be rewritten as
λqN1
λqN1 +1−qN1
= 2A, where qN1 =
q1
1−(1−q1)x1 .
Solving, we obtain
x1 = 1− (1− 2A)λq1
2A(1− q1)
for 0 < x1 < 1. This holds when
λq1
2
(
λq1+(1−q1)
) < A < 1
2
. Clearly, we have x1 increasing
in A and decreasing in q1.
Proposition 4 implies that the strategy of RA1 depends on its own and its competitor’s
reputation. When A is large, RA1 always gives a GR to a bad project. Conversely, when
A is small RA1 behaves honestly and gives NR to bad projects. In the intermediate
range, RA1 has a mixed strategy, with 0 < x1 < 1. Note that the lower threshold for A
is increasing with RA1’s reputation.
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The results imply that RA1 tends to lie less as its reputation increases. The intuition
behind this result is straightforward. Since we assumed pG = 1, the reputation of RA1
goes to zero immediately after a project fails. This means that the cost of lying increases
with RA1’s reputation while the benefit of lying stays constant. Hence it is not surprising
that RA1 prefers to lie less as its reputation increases.21
Moreover, RA1’s strategy tends to increase with RA2’s reputation. As explained
before, competition has two opposite effects on the behaviour of RA1: the disciplining
effect and the market-sharing effect. When the reputation of its opponent increases,
RA1 will find it less attractive to increase its own reputation given a smaller expected
future market share, and hence will behave more laxly. On the other hand, RA1 may
have incentives to behave honestly when RA2’s reputation increases in order to maintain
its market leader position. Our analysis shows that the market-sharing effect tends to
dominate the disciplining effect, using first order Taylor approximation. One potential
explanation could be that, in our model, the market share of a rating agency is determined
not only by its reputation relative to that of its competitor, but also by the absolute level
of its reputation. That is, even a monopolistic RA cannot behave totally laxly, because
otherwise its reputation would become too low to credibly rate most projects. Therefore,
the incentives of a RA to maintain good reputation, even in absence of competition,
render the disciplining effect of competition weaker. We believe this is reasonable because
in reality, given rational investors, a monopolistic RA would not have unbounded market
powers.
21Our results in section 5 show that this is no longer true if pG < 1. The penalty on reputation will be
smaller as the reputation of RA increases, i.e. the cost of ratings inflation can decrease with reputation,
resulting in a ‘u-shaped’ relationship between strategy and reputation.
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Figure 15: Excess Lax Behaviour for different values of λ and pG (δ = 0.9)
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Figure 16: Excess Lax Behaviour for different values of λ and pG (continued)
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C.2 Expected Total Welfare
The reputation of RA1 (q1) above which the expected total welfare is always greater in the monopoly
case than in the duopoly case, for different values of q2 (δ = 0.9)
Parameter values q2 = 0.25 q2 = 0.45 q2 = 0.55 q2 = 0.75
λ = 0.5, pG = 0.5 q1 = 0.23 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.52 q1 = 0.69
λ = 0.5, pG = 0.7 q1 = 0.23 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.52 q1 = 0.69
λ = 0.5, pG = 0.9 q1 = 0.23 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.52 q1 = 0.69
λ = 0.7, pG = 0.5 q1 = 0.15 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.51 q1 = 0.67
λ = 0.7, pG = 0.7 q1 = 0.15 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.51 q1 = 0.67
λ = 0.7, pG = 0.9 q1 = 0.15 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.51 q1 = 0.67
λ = 0.9, pG = 0.5 q1 = 0.13 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.51 q1 = 0.66
λ = 0.9, pG = 0.7 q1 = 0.13 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.51 q1 = 0.66
λ = 0.9, pG = 0.9 q1 = 0.13 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.51 q1 = 0.66
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Abstract
This paper studies banks’ decision to form financial interconnections us-
ing a model of financial contagion that explicitly takes into account the crisis
state of the world. This allows us to model the network formation decision
as optimising behaviour of competitive banks, where they balance the bene-
fits of forming interbank linkages against the cost of contagion. We use this
framework to study various market frictions that can result in excessive in-
terconnectedness that was seen during the crisis. In this paper, we focus on
two channels that arises from regulatory intervention - deposit insurance and
the too big to fail problem.
Keywords: Contagion, network formation, financial crises, deposit insurance, too-big-to-fail.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis that hit the world economy in 2007 has made clear the inter-
connected nature of the global financial system. What started as difficulties in the US
sub-prime mortgage market rapidly escalated and spilled over to markets all over the
world. Banks, uncertain of the interconnections and fearful of contagion became less
willing to lend money to each other. Interbank lending rates started to rise and soon the
market for short-term lending dried-up. The credit crunch ultimately triggered a bank
run at the British mortgage lender Northern Rock - something not seen in the UK for
over 140 years and in Western Europe for the last 15 years.
The mechanics of financial contagion are well studied and the literature broadly takes
two approaches - examining direct balance sheet linkages and indirect linkages operating
through fire sales and expectations (see Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2009) for a survey
of the literature on financial crises). The benefits of financial interlinkages and networks
are also well known and stem primarily from better liquidity sharing and diversification.
However, the literature on networks and contagion has mostly focussed on comparing the
social costs and benefits of different network structures as opposed to the banks decision
to form the network.
This paper attempts to fill this gap and develops a simple model to study banks’
decision to form financial interconnections. This framework allows us to study various
market frictions that can influence this decision and result in a wedge between socially
optimal network formation and excessive interconnectedness that was seen during the
crisis. While such suboptimal interconnections can arise from the several sources such
as the underestimation of the crisis probability and disaster myopia, the focus of this
paper is on two sources of market frictions that arises from regulatory intervention - de-
posit insurance and the existence of systemically important financial institutions (SIFI).
While the former is an explicit government guarantee, the latter is a more subtle implicit
guarantee that is embedded in the modern financial system.
Most papers that study contagion in the banking system model the crisis state as
an exogenous perturbation of the model. In these models, the crisis state is therefore
modeled as a zero probability event. In order to study banks’ decision whether or not to
54
form an interconnection, we develop a simplified model of financial contagion with direct
linkages through an interbank market that explicitly takes into account the crisis state
of the world. This allows us to endogenise the network formation decision with banks’
recognising the risk of contagion when forming an interconnection in the form of an
interbank market to share liquidity. We model this decision as an optimising behaviour
of banks, where they balance the benefit of sharing liquidity against the cost of contagion.
We use this framework to explore some of the market frictions that can lead to sub-
optimal interconnections. One obvious market friction that can lead to such suboptimal
network formation is underestimation of the risk of crisis which can stem from a variety
of sources such as disaster myopia. While important, this is not the focus of our paper
and we only briefly touch upon this potential source of suboptimal interconnections. We
instead focus on deposit insurance and the existence of SIFIs. We show that explicit
deposit insurance and more implicit too big to fail type perceptions of government guar-
antees to SIFIs creates a wedge between social and private optimality. In the presence of
these implicit and explicit guarantees, competitive banks find it optimal to participate in
the interbank market even when the risk of contagion is high and it is socially suboptimal
to do so. This results in excessive interconnections in equilibrium.
We model contagion through direct balance-sheet linkages and show how these con-
nections can result in contagious bank runs. Following Bryant (1980) and Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), we model bank runs in a setting where depositors have uncertain con-
sumption needs and the long term investment is costly to liquidate. In these papers,
if depositors believe that other depositors will withdraw then all agents find it rational
to redeem their claims and a bank run occurs. Another equilibrium exists where every-
body believes no panic will occur and agents withdraw their funds according to their
consumption needs. The theory is silent on which of the two equilibria will be selected
and depositors belief is coordinated by ‘sun-spots’.
Allen and Gale (2000) study how the banking system responds to contagion when
banks are connected under different network structures. Banks perfectly insure against
liquidity shocks by exchanging interbank deposits. The connections created by swapping
deposits, however, expose the system to contagion. The authors show that incomplete
networks are more prone to contagion than complete structures. Better connected net-
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works are more resilient since the proportion of the losses in one bank’s portfolio is
transferred to more banks through interbank agreements. To show this, they take the
case of an incomplete network where the failure of a bank may trigger the failure of
the entire banking system. They prove that, for the same set of parameters, if banks
are connected in a complete structure, then the system is more resilient with regard to
contagious effects.
Dasgupta (2004) also explores how linkages between banks, represented by cross hold-
ing of deposits, can be a source of contagious breakdowns. However, using the global
games techniques developed by Morris and Shin (2000, 2003), Dasgupta isolates an unique
equilibrium which depends on depositors private signal about the banks’ fundamentals.
In the same spirit, Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007) show that there is a positive probabil-
ity of bankruptcy and propagation of a crises across regions when banks keep interbank
deposits and this may lead to excessive risk. Rochet and Vives (2004) and Goldstein
and Pauzner (2005) also use global games techniques to study banking crises. Chen,
Goldstein, and Jiang (2010) establishes the empirical applicability of the global games
approach using a detailed dataset on mutual funds.
Our paper is also related to the literature on financial networks. Allen and Babus
(2009) provide a comprehensive survey of this literature, most of which studies network
effect rather than network formation. These papers focus on how different network struc-
tures respond to the breakdown of a single bank in order to identify network structures
that are more resilient. Gale and Kariv (2007) study the process of exchange in financial
networks and show that when networks are incomplete, substantial costs of intermedia-
tion can arise and lead to uncertainty of trade as well as market breakdowns. Eisenberg
and Noe (2001) investigate default by firms that are part of a single clearing mechanism
and show the existence of a clearing payment vector that defines the level of connections
between firms. The authors develop an algorithm that allows them to evaluate the effects
of small shocks on the system. This algorithm produces a natural measure of systemic
risk based on how many waves of defaults are required to induce a given firm in the
system to fail. Similarly, Minguez-Afonso and Shin (2007) use lattice-theoretic methods
to study liquidity and systemic risk in high-value payment systems.
Gai and Kapadia (2010) develop a model of contagion using techniques from the
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literature on complex networks to assess the fragility of the financial system based on
banks’ capital buffers, the degree of connectivity and the liquidity of the market for
failed banking assets. They find that while greater connectivity reduces the likelihood
of widespread default, the shocks may have a significantly larger impact on the system
when they do occur. Moreover, the resilience of the network to large shocks depends on
shocks hitting particular fragile points associated with structural vulnerabilities.
There are some models that study endogenous network formation. Leitner (2005)
constructs a model where the success of an agent’s investment in a project depends on the
investments of other agents in the network. Since endowments are randomly distributed
across agents, an agent may not have enough cash to make the necessary investment.
In this case, agents may be willing to bail out other agents to prevent the collapse
of the whole network. Leitner examines the design of optimal financial networks that
minimize the trade-off between risk sharing and the potential for collapse. In a related
paper, Kahn and Santos (2010) investigate whether banks choose the optimal degree of
mutual insurance against liquidity shocks. They show that when there is a shortage of
exogenously supplied liquidity, which can be supplemented by bank liquidity creation,
the banks generally fail to find the correct degree of interdependence. In aggregate, they
become too risky.
Babus (2009) models the decision of the bank to ex-ante commit to ensure each other
against the risk of contagion using a network formation game approach and shows that
when banks endogenously form networks to respond to contagion risk, financial stability is
supported. The model predicts a connectivity threshold above which contagion does not
occur, and banks form links to reach this threshold. However, an implicit cost associated
with being involved in a link prevents banks from forming more connections than required
by the connectivity threshold. Banks manage to form networks where contagion rarely
occurs. Castiglionesi and Navarro (2007) are also interested in decentralizing the network
of banks that is optimal from a social planner perspective. In a setting where banks invest
on behalf of depositors and there are positive network externalities on the investment
returns, fragility arises when banks that are not sufficiently capitalized gamble with
depositors’ money. When the probability of bankruptcy is low, the decentralized solution
approximates the first best.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up our model and
outlines the costs and benefits of participating in the interbank market. Section 3 solves
the model for the banks’ optimal participation strategy. In the absence of externalities
and market failures, competitive banks optimal strategy is socially optimal. Section 4
introduces market frictions and explores how these frictions can create a wedge between
the socially optimal and privately optimal participation strategy, resulting in excessive
interconnectedness in equilibrium. Section 5 concludes. The proofs are presented in the
appendix.
2 Model Setup
We consider an economy which extends over three dates, t = 0, 1, 2, with two non-
overlapping ‘regions’ A and B. We assume that each region is populated by a continuum
of depositors and a single representative competitive bank. Banks are competitive in the
sense that they makes zero profit in equilibrium and offer depositors the highest possible
return. There is a single good that is used for both consumption and investment and
serves as the numeraire.
Depositors We consider a continuum of ex-ante identical depositors who each live
for three periods. The depositors have liquidity preferences as in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) - a depositor is either impatient and wishes to consume at date 1 or patient and
wishes to consume at date 2. The number of patient and impatient depositors depend
on the state of the world.
Depositors are uncertain about their consumption needs at date 0, but learn their
preferences privately at date 1. Let ψ denote the fraction of impatient depositors, who
wish to consume at period 1. A depositors’ utility function is -
u(c1, c2) =
c1 with probability ψc2 with probability 1− ψ
where ct is consumption at date t. Depositors are endowed with a unit of the con-
sumption good at date 0 only, which they can invest in a storage technology or deposit
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at the bank. If they choose to deposit at the bank, depositors can choose to withdraw at
date 1 or date 2. Given depositor preferences, impatient depositors always withdraw at
date 1, while patient depositors decide strategically.
States of the World The distribution of patient and impatient depositors depend
on the state of the world. In ‘normal ’ times, we assume that each region can have high
or low demand for liquidity, such that ψ ∈ {ω + x, ω − x}. These liquidity states are
negatively correlated across regions. We further assume that both states are equally
likely, implying that aggregate liquidity (ω) is constant in normal times.
Additionally, there exists a ‘crisis ’ state when the liquidity demand is very high. In
order to simplify our calculations, we assume that in the crisis state all consumers are
impatient, i.e. ψ = 1.1 These crisis states are low probability events and are indepen-
dently and identically distributed across the two regions, with probability γ, where γ ≈ 0.
Figure 1 summaries the possible states of the world.
•
Crisis,
ψi = 1
Crisis, ψ−i = 1
γ
High, ψ−i = ω + x
1
2
− γ
2
Low, ψ−i = ω − x
1
2
− γ2
γ
Low,
ψi = ω−x
Crisis, ψ−i = 1γ
High, ψ−i = ω + x1− γ
1
2
− γ
2
High,
ψi = ω+x
Crisis, ψ−i = 1γ
Low, ψ−i = ω − x1− γ
1
2
−
γ
2
Figure 1: Liquidity States, i ∈ {A,B}
Assets Following Allen and Gale (2000), we assume that there are two types of
1Note that for our results to hold, we only require that the liquidity demand be reasonably high
during the crisis state, i.e. ψ >> ω + x. This is because when liquidity demand is sufficiently high, the
patient depositors also find it optimal to withdraw, effectively making ψ = 1.
59
assets. The liquid asset represents storage technology. One unit of consumption good
invested in the liquid asset at date t produces one unit of consumption good at period
t + 1. The other asset is the long asset which takes two periods to mature. Investment
in the long asset can take place only at t = 0, and the asset provides a return R > 1 in
period t = 2. If the asset is liquidated prematurely at period t = 1, it produces 0 < r < 1
units of the consumption good. Figure 2 summaries the cash flows from the two assets.
Liquid Asset
Liquid Asset
Long Asset
t
−1
−1
0
1
−1
r
(liquidated)
1
1
R
(not liquidated)
2
Figure 2: Asset Cash Flows
Deposit Contracts At date 0, banks collect deposits from depositors and offers
demand deposit contracts. The demand deposit contacts’ allow depositors to withdraw
either c1 units of consumption at date 1 or c2 units of consumption at date 2. Following
Dasgupta (2004), we focus on deposit contacts that offer conversion of deposits into cash
at par at t = 1, i.e. c1 = 1. Note that the deposit contract is entered into at date 0 and
cannot be contingent on the depositor type since the depositors learn their preferences
(patient or impatient) privately.
The role of banks is to invest on the behalf of depositors and insure them against
liquidity shocks. By pooling the assets of a large number of consumers, the bank can
offer insurance to consumers against their uncertain liquidity demands, giving depositors
some of the benefits of the long asset without subjecting them to liquidation costs in
case they turn out to be impatient depositors. Our model generates multiple equilibria
in line with Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale (2000), i.e. even when
the bank is solvent, patient depositors may wish to withdraw their deposits at t = 1, if
they believe that enough other patient depositors will do the same, leading to a bank
run - the so called ‘sunspot’ equilibria. Using the global games techniques outlined in
Morris and Shin (2000, 2003), Dasgupta (2004) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), we
can generate unique equilibria in our model by introducing an arbitrarily small amount
of uncertainty. However, in order to keep our model simple, we assume a deterministic
return R at period t = 2 and focus on the no-run efficient equilibrium where, as long
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as the bank remains solvent, patient depositors wait till period t = 2 to withdraw their
funds. The existence of deposit insurance ensures that no-run is the dominant strategy.
Banks Competitive banks choose their balance sheets at date t=0 such that they
offer depositors highest possible returns. They hold a fraction of their portfolio, y in
the liquid asset and invest the remainder (1 − y) in the long asset. They also decide
whether or not to participate in the interbank market to insure against regional liquidity
shocks. They do this by exchanging interbank deposits at date t = 0. Since ex-ante,
bank deposits are identical, the banks budget constraint is not affected by the exchange
of interbank deposits.
At date 1, the bank uses the liquid asset to service withdrawals by depositors. If
the bank holds excess liquidity, i.e. y ≥ ψ, it can invest the surplus in the liquid asset
and use it to repay patient depositors in period 2. However, in case liquid assets are not
sufficient, i.e. y < ψ, the bank has to rely on the interbank market or liquidate the long
asset.
Given the asset payoffs, there exists an obvious pecking order for banks. Banks uses
the liquid asset in the first instance. Next, they meet any shortfall by tapping into the
interbank market. This is only possible when the banks collectively decide to participate
in the interbank market at t = 0 and exchange interbank deposits b. Liquidation is
costly and is only used as a last resort. Banks optimally choose their portfolio taking
into account the expected withdrawals at date 1.
Interbank Market Since liquidity states are negatively correlated across regions,
aggregate liquidity is constant in ‘normal ’ times. Participation in the interbank market
allows banks’ to share liquidity and insure against regional liquidity shocks (Allen and
Gale, 2000; Dasgupta, 2004). In particular, banks hold the average level of liquidity
demand, ω of the short asset and insure against regional liquidity shocks by holding
interbank deposits x. This allows banks to avoid costly liquidation of the long asset.
However, participation in the interbank market also exposes banks to possible contagion.
In our setting, this contagion risk is modelled by the ‘crisis ’ state, which occurs with a
small probability γ. We assume that the interbank market shuts down in the crisis state,
resulting in contagion. While we acknowledge that there are different ways to model the
impact of the crisis state on the interbank market, we follow the literature on financial
61
networks and contagion and assume that interbank deposits disappear during the crisis
state. We believe that this assumption is consistent with the evidence from the recent
financial crisis, where the interbank market shutdown in the aftermath of the collapse
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.2 Furthermore, in case of insolvency, interbank
deposits are likely to be junior to retail deposits and even if the interbank deposits pay-off
a fraction of their value after liquidation, this is unlikely to be available at t = 1.
We can illustrate the contagion channel through an example. Suppose region A is
in the normal state while there is a crisis in region B. In case the banks decide not to
participate in the interbank market, region A banks would ex-ante hold enough of the
liquid asset to ensure that they have enough liquidity to be viable in both high an low
liquidity states. The bank run would therefore be limited to the region B bank.
On the other hand, participation in the interbank market allows banks to share liq-
uidity and optimise their holding of the liquid asset. Since liquidity shocks are negatively
correlated, they can use their interbank deposits to address any liquidity shortfalls in the
high liquidity demand state. However, this dependence on the interbank market exposes
them to contagion risk - the crisis in region B can result in a run on the region A bank.
This is because the region A bank, reliant on the interbank market, would now hold
insufficient liquidity to pay impatient depositors in the high liquidity state. Therefore,
when the interbank market shuts down due to the crisis in region B, the region A bank is
forced to liquidate the long asset, resulting in a run on the bank. Note that in our model,
contagion takes place only when high liquidity demand coincides with a crisis in the other
region. This is because our model abstracts from other channels of contagion such as
asset fire sales. If these channels are taken into account, the probability of contagion is
likely to increase significantly.
3 Model Solution - Social Optimality
We can now solve for the banks decision to participate in the interbank market. We
do this in 3 stages. First, we look at the case where the bank does not participate in
the interbank market. Second, we introduce the interbank market. Finally, we compare
2See Bank of International Settlements (2009).
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the costs and benefits of participation in the interbank market and solve for the bank’s
optimal participation strategy.
No Interbank Market
The bank offers deposit contract (c1, c2) at date 0 that allows depositors to withdraw
either c1 = 1 at date 1 or c2 at date 2. That bank also chooses its balance sheet and
holds a fraction of its portfolio, y in the liquid asset and invests the remainder (1− y) in
the long asset such that it maximises depositor utility. Note that during the crisis state,
all consumers are impatient and withdraw their deposits at t = 1. Therefore, unless the
bank portfolio consists of only liquid asset - which makes it redundant, the bank goes
bust. Therefore, when choosing the balance sheet, the bank does not to take into account
the crisis state and instead optimally chooses its balance sheet taking into account only
the high and low liquidity demand states during normal times.
At date 1, the proportion of impatient depositors, ψ withdraw their deposits. If the
bank holds enough liquid assets, i.e. y ≥ ψ, the bank pays out the impatient depositors
c1 = 1 and invests the surplus in the short asset. At date 2, it pays patient depositors c2,
which equals the surplus cash from date 1, (y − ψ) and the returns from the long asset,
(1−y)R. On the other hand, if banks hold insufficient liquid assets, i.e. y < ψ, the bank
is forced to liquidate a part of its long asset in order to pays out the impatient depositors
c1 = 1 at date 1. It then uses the remaining long asset to pay the patient depositors c2
at date 2. In case the bank is unable to pay patient depositors c2 ≥ 1 at date 2, the
patient depositors optimally withdraw their deposits at date 1, resulting in a run on the
bank. Additionally, if the bank is unable to pay c1 = 1 to all depositors withdrawing at
date 1, it is declared insolvent and goes bust.
Banks face uncertain liquidity demand at date 1 as the distribution of patient and
impatient depositors depend on the state of the world. Since liquidating the long asset
prematurely at date 1 is costly for the bank, 0 < r < 1, the bank holds liquidity in the
form of investment in the liquid asset. However, this liquidity has an opportunity cost -
foregone investment in the long asset. Therefore, banks face a trade off and choose their
optimal portfolio taking into account the relative costs of liquidity and liquidation.
Proposition 5. When not participating in the interbank market, the bank optimally holds
y = ω + x of the liquid asset.
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Proof. See Appendix A.1
Proposition 5 implies that the bank finds it optimal to hold enough liquidity to pay
impatient depositors in the high liquidity demand state, although this has an opportunity
cost in terms of surplus liquid asset and foregone investment in the low liquidity demand
state. When choosing their balance sheets, bank trade-off the costs of liquidation against
the opportunity cost of investing in the long asset. For the rest of this paper, we assume
that the relative to the cost of liquidation outweighs the benefit of holding more of the
long asset. More formally,
Assumption 1. We assume that for a given return on the long asset, liquidation is
sufficiently costly such that,
r <
R
2R− 1
Using Proposition 5, we can now write down the depositor pay-off’s in different states
of the world.
Proposition 6. The depositor’s payoff in different states of the world when the bank
does not participate in the interbank market is as follows -
Liquidity State Probability c1 c2
High Liquidity
1
2
− γ
2
1 R
(ω + x)
Low Liquidity
1
2
− γ
2
1 2x+(1−ω−x)R
1−ω+x < R
(ω − x)
Crisis γ
ω + x+ (1− ω − x)r < 1
Bank Run, everyone withdraws at date 1
There is no run on the bank in normal times.
We consider each case in turn. Suppose the demand for liquidity is high, i.e. ψ = ω+x.
Since the bank hold y = ω+x of the liquid asset, the withdrawal demand from impatient
depositors exactly matches up with the availability of the liquid asset and c1 = 1. The
investment in the long asset, (1 − y) also matches up with the demand from patient
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depositors, (1 − ω − x). Thus, c2 = R. Since c2 > c1 = 1, patient depositors find it
optimal to withdraw their deposits at date 2 and there is no run on the bank.
On the other hand, if the demand for liquidity is low, i.e. ψ = ω − x, the bank has
excess liquidity at date 1. The demand from impatient depositors at date 1 equals ω−x,
while the bank holds y = ω+ x of the liquid asset. The bank invests this surplus cash in
the liquid asset at date t = 1. At date 2, the bank has a cash flow of 2x from the liquid
asset and (1 − ω − x)R from the long asset, which it uses to pay (1 − ω + x) patient
depositors c2 =
2x+(1−ω−x)R
1−ω+x .
Corollary 3. In the low liquidity demand state with no interbank market, 1 < c2 < R
Proof. See Appendix A.2
c2 > 1 ensures that there is no run on the bank and patient depositors wait till date
2 to withdraw their deposits. However, since the bank had excess liquidity at date 1,
c2 < R. This represents the cost of holding the liquid asset. Banks are forced to hold this
excess liquidity in order to avoid liquidating the long asset in the high liquidity demand
case.
Finally, in the crisis state, all depositors withdraw their deposit at date 1 and the bank
is forced to liquidate the long asset. At date 1, the bank gets (ω+x) from the liquid asset
and (1−ω−x)r from liquidating the long asset. Since r < 1, c1 = ω+x+(1−ω−x)r < 1
and the bank goes bust.
We can now calculate the expected pay-off of the depositors, taking into account the
ex-post distribution of patient and impatient depositors.
Proposition 7. Expected pay-off of the depositors with no interbank market is -
ΠNIB =
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
[(ω + x) + (1− ω − x)R] + γ [ω + x+ (1− ω − x)r]
+
(
1
2
− γ
2
)[
(ω − x) + (1− ω + x) · 2x+ (1− ω − x)R
1− ω + x
]
=R(1− ω − x) + ω + x− (1− ω − x)(R− r)γ
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Interbank Market
We now introduce the interbank market. Participation in interbank market expands
the bank’s sources of liquidity. During normal times, since liquidity shocks are negatively
correlated, the interbank market allows banks in different regions to share liquidity and
economise on the holding of the liquid asset. Since aggregate liquidity (ω) is fixed during
normal times, a bank in a region with high liquidity demand can, through the interbank
market, tap the surplus liquidity in the other region with low liquidity demand. This
allows banks to offer a higher c2 to patient depositors in normal times. However, this
comes at a cost since it makes the bank dependent on the interbank market. The bank
optimally no longer holds enough liquid assets to meet the demands of impatient deposi-
tors at date 1. When the interbank market disappears during a crisis, banks are exposed
to contagion risk. When faced with high liquidity demand, banks are forced to liquidate
the long asset.
Proposition 8. When participating in the interbank market, the bank optimally holds
y = ω of the short asset and exchanges interbank deposits of size x.
Proof. See Appendix A.3
Proposition 8 holds as long as liquidity shocks are materially significant, i.e. crisis
in the other region can lead to contagion and crisis through the disappearance of the
interbank market. Formally,
Assumption 2. We assume that liquidity shock
x >
(1− ω)(R− 1)
R
r
− 1
The above condition is weak and as satisfied for all plausible parameters values. This
result is similar to the condition derived in Allen and Gale (2000), but in our setting
the bank explicitly take into account the probability of the crisis state and potential
contagion. As before, we look at the depositor’s payoff on a case by case basis.
Proposition 9. The depositor’s payoff in different states of the world when the bank
participates in the interbank market is as follows -
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Liquidity State Other Region Probability c1 c2
High Liquidity No Crisis
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
(1− γ) 1 R
(ω + x) Crisis
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
γ
ω + (1− ω)r < 1
Contagion: Bank Run, everyone withdraws at date 1
Low Liquidity No Crisis
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
(1− γ) 1 R
(ω − x) Crisis (1
2
− γ
2
)
γ 1 x+(1−ω)R
1−ω+x < R
Crisis γ
ω + (1− ω)r < 1
Bank Run, everyone withdraws at date 1
We consider each case in turn, starting with the normal times, when there is no crisis
in either region. Suppose region A banks are in the high liquidity demand state, i.e.
ψ = ω+x. At date 1, region A bank faces a withdrawal demand of ω+x from impatient
depositors. The bank holds y = ω of the short asset and can withdraw its interbank
deposit of x. Since the liquidity shock in region B is negatively correlated, the bank in
this region faces a withdrawal demand of ω−x and can use the excess cash (arising from
y = ω holding of the short asset) to pay the region A bank. Thus, the cash flows match
up and c1 = 1.
At date 2, the region A bank receives (1− ω)R from the long asset and has to make
an interbank payment of xR to the region B bank. Since it faces a withdrawal demand
of (1− ω − x) from patient depositors, it offers c2 = R. Region B bank receives (1− ω)
from the long asset and xR from the region A bank, which matches up with the demand
of (1 − ω + x) from patient depositors and once again c2 = R. Since c2 > c1, patient
depositors find it optimal to wait and withdraw their deposits at date 2 and there is no
run on either of the banks.
An analogous analysis holds for the case where there is no crisis and the region A
bank faces low liquidity demand, i.e. ψ = ω − x. Once again, there is no aggregate
liquidity shock and the cash flows match up with c1 = 1 and c2 = R.
We now turn to the cases where there is a crisis in region B. The region A bank
gets exposed to this crisis through the interbank market, or more precisely, through the
disappearance of the interbank market on which it is now dependant. Suppose the bank
is region A faces a high liquidity demand, i.e. ψ = ω + x. Since it only holds y = ω
of the short asset and the interbank market disappears due to the crisis, the bank in
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region A is forced to liquidate a fraction l = x
r
of the long asset, even though there is no
crisis in region A. As long as l ≤ (1 − ω), the bank is able to pay date 1 depositors c1.
However, if Assumption 2 holds, after liquidating l at date 1, the region A bank does not
have enough long assets to offer patient depositors c2 ≥ 1 and patient depositors find it
optimal to withdraw their deposits at date 1 and there is a run on the bank.
Corollary 4. If Assumption 2 holds, contagion results in a run on the bank during the
high liquidity demand state.
Proof. See Appendix A.4
Contagion results in a run on the bank and it is forced to liquidate all its assets. The
payoff for depositors is c1 = ω + (1− ω)r < 1 and the bank goes bust.
Conversely, consider the case where there is a crisis in region B, but the region A bank
faces a low liquidity demand state, i.e. ψ = ω − x. In this case y = ω of the short term
asset is sufficient to meet the demands of the impatient depositors and c1 = 1. However,
the interbank market disappears due to crisis in region B and the region A bank is forced
to invest the surplus cash (x) in the short asset. Therefore, due to the disappearance of
the interbank market, it can no longer earn return R on this surplus cash.
At date 2, the region A bank receives (1 − ω)R from the long asset and has x cash,
with with it has to meet the withdrawal demand of (1− ω + x) from patient depositors.
Therefore, c2 =
x+(1−ω)R
1−ω+x . Clearly, 1 < c2 < R. Since we assume that there are no fire
sale externalities, there is no run on the region A bank due to the crisis in region B.
Nevertheless, the region A bank still suffers due to contagion since it can no longer pay
patient depositors c2 = R.
Finally, we consider the crisis state in region A. The state in region B is now irrelevant.
All depositors in region A withdraw their deposit at date 1 and the bank is forced to
liquidate the long asset. At date 1, the bank gets (ω from the short asset and (1 − ω)r
from liquidating the long asset. Since r < 1, c1 = ω + (1 − ω)r < 1 and the bank goes
bust.
As before, we calculate the expected pay-off of the depositors, when the bank decides
to participate in the interbank market.
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Proposition 10. Expected pay-off of the depositors when the bank participates in the
interbank market is -
ΠIB =
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
(1− γ) [(ω + x) + (1− ω − x)R] +
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
γ [ω + (1− ω) r]
+
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
(1− γ) [(ω − x) + (1− ω + x)R] + γ [ω + (1− ω)r]
+
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
γ
[
(ω − x) + (1− ω + x) · x+ (1− ω)R
1− ω + x
]
=ω + (1− ω)R− 3
2
(1− ω)(R− r)γ + 1
2
(1− ω)(R− r)γ2
Participation strategy
We are now in a position to derive the bank’s participation strategy. Our analysis
suggests that the bank faces a tradeoff - participation in the interbank market allows
the bank to offer higher deposit contract (higher c2) to depositors during normal times,
but exposes it to contagion during the crisis state. Using Propositions 6 and 9 we
can compare depositor payoff from not participating and participating in the interbank
market in different states of the world.
The main benefit from participating in the interbank market arises during normal
times, when the bank is able to offer higher deposit contracts during the low liquidity
demand state. When banks do not participate in the interbank market, they are forced
to hold excess liquidity in order to avoid costly liquidation of the long asset. However,
in the low liquidity demand state this excess liquidity in the short asset means that the
bank has to offer a lower level of consumption to patient depositors at date 2. Thus
c2 =
2x+(1−ω−x)R
1−ω+x < R. On the other hand, participation in the interbank market allows
the bank to offer depositors c2 = R by using the interbank market to earn a return R on
its surplus cash.
The bank also gains marginally in the state where there is a crisis in the other region,
but low liquidity demand in the bank’s own region. This is because, in the low liquidity
demand state, the bank does not need to access the interbank liquidity market at date
t = 1. Although the bank looses out via-a-vis the normal state in which the bank could
access the interbank market at date t = 2 and offer depositors c2 = R, it still gains vis-
a-vis non participation in the interbank market because participating in the interbank
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market allows banks to hold lower levels of liquidity (ω as opposed to ω + x), which
allows the bank to offer a marginally higher return x+(1−ω)R
1−ω+x
(
> 2x+(1−ω−x)R
1−ω+x , the return
the bank can offer when it decides not to participate in the interbank market
)
.
Conversely, the main cost of participation in the interbank market manifests itself
through the contagion channel, when the crisis in the other region results in a run on
the bank in the high liquidity demand state. When the bank does not participate in
the interbank market, it holds enough liquidity to pay impatient depositors in the high
liquidity state without liquidating the long asset. This in turn allows the bank to pay
patient depositors c2 = R. However, when participating in the interbank market, the
bank is dependent on the interbank market to pay impatient date 1 depositors during the
high liquidity demand state. When the interbank market disappears, the bank is forced
to liquidate its long asset. If assumption 2 holds, this results in a run on the bank, all
depositors receive c1 = ω + (1− ω)r < 1 and the bank goes bust.
During the crisis state, there is a run on the bank and it goes bust irrespective
of whether or not it decided to participate in the interbank market. However, when
participating in the interbank market, depositors face a marginally larger loss, since the
bank now holds lower levels of liquidity (ω as opposed to ω + x), and therefore in case
of a run, can offer depositors c1 = ω + (1 − ω)r < ω + x + (1 − ω − x)r, the return the
bank can offer when it does not participate in the interbank market.
The bank optimally chooses its participation strategy by comparing the cost and bene-
fit of participating in the interbank market, i.e by comparing ΠNIB and ΠIB (Proposition
7 and 10). This, in turn, depend on the probability of the crisis state, γ.
Proposition 11. ΠIB − ΠNIB is decreasing in crisis probability γ, i.e. the benefits of
participating in the interbank market are decreasing in γ.
Proof. See Appendix A.5
Since the main benefits of participating in the interbank market arise in normal times
and the loss arises during the crisis state, the expected gain from participation in the
interbank market falls as the probability of crisis increases.
Proposition 12. There exists a γ∗ such that ΠIB > ΠNIB for γ < γ∗ and ΠIB < ΠNIB
for γ > γ∗.
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Proof. See Appendix A.6
As long as the probability of crisis is less than the critical level of γ, γ∗, i.e. γ ≤ γ∗,
the optimal strategy for the bank is to participate in the interbank market. However,
as γ rises, the potential costs from contagion increases. When the probability of crisis is
relatively significant, γ > γ∗ the bank finds it optimal not to participate in the interbank
market.
Proposition 12 gives us the socially optimal threshold level for the crisis probability
γ∗ beyond which the potential costs of contagion outweigh the liquidity sharing benefits
of network formation. In the absence of market frictions, private and social costs are
aligned and the privately optimal strategy is also socially optimal.
4 Market Frictions - Private Optimality
In this section, we discuss some market frictions that can result in excessive inter-
connectedness. These market frictions create a wedge between the socially optimal and
privately optimal participation strategy, resulting in suboptimal network formation that
was seen during the crisis. The frictions can be broadly divided into 2 categories - (i)
market frictions that result in underestimation of the probability of crisis; (ii) frictions
where the probability of crisis is correctly measured but banks still optimally choose to
form suboptimal interconnections.
While the underestimation of the risk of crisis is important and can stem from a
variety of sources such as disaster myopia, this is not the focus of our paper and we
only briefly touch upon this potential source of excessive interconnectedness. We instead
focus on deposit insurance and the too-big-to-fail problem. We show that explicit deposit
insurance and more implicit too big to fail type perceptions of government guarantees
to SIFIs creates a wedge between social and private optimality. In the presence of these
implicit and explicit guarantees, competitive banks find it optimal to participate in the
interbank market even when the risk of contagion is high and it is socially suboptimal to
do so (γ > γ∗). This results in excessive interconnectedness in equilibrium.
Deposit Insurance
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Most jurisdictions require banks to participate in some form of government guaran-
teed deposit insurance with the intention of protecting bank deposit holders from losses
that could occur in the event of a bank failure. While primarily a means of protecting
individual (especially small) bank depositors, deposit insurance also serves to protect the
financial system from inefficient bank runs and panics - the so called ‘sunspot equilib-
rium’ highlighted in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale (2000) where even
solvent banks may fail if enough depositors believe that other depositors will withdraw
their deposits.
However, deposit insurance has the potential to undermine market discipline as de-
positors bear little or none of the risk associated with bank failures and therefore seek
higher returns, even if it entails contagion risk. This in turn compels competitive banks
to offer the highest possible returns - which in our setting is possible by optimising on
the holdings of the short asset and participating in the interbank market. This cre-
ates a wedge between socially optimal γ∗ and depositors desired γ, leading to excessive
suboptimal interconnections in equilibrium.
Since deposit guarantee is contingent on bank failure, in our model, it is only paid out
in the crisis state. Furthermore, since the deposit contracts in our model offers conversion
of deposits into cash at par at t = 1, we model deposit insurance as a guarantee that
depositors get c1 = 1 at t = 1 even if the bank is insolvent and fails. This effectively
means that all depositors withdraw c1 = 1 at t = 1, implying that the patient depositors
loose out on c2 = R at t = 2.
Put differently, we assumes that the deposit insurance scheme only protects depositor
capital and does not guarantee interest. We can make the alternative assumption that
the deposit insurance also guarantees interest, which in this setting would imply that the
deposit insurance scheme guarantees R to patient depositors at t = 2. This alternative
assumption strengthens our results.
We can now revisit depositor’s payoff from participating and not participating in the
interbank market respectively. First consider Proposition 6 with deposit insurance.
Proposition 13. The depositor’s payoff in different states of the world when the bank
does not participate in the interbank market and is protected by deposit insurance is as
follows -
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Liquidity State Probability c1 c2
High Liquidity
1
2
− γ
2
1 R
(ω + x)
Low Liquidity
1
2
− γ
2
1 2x+(1−ω−x)R
1−ω+x < R
(ω − x)
Crisis γ
1
Bank Run, deposit insurance pays out
Comparing Proposition 6 and 13, with deposit insurance, depositors receive c1 = 1 >
ω + x+ (1− ω − x)r during the crisis state, while their payoff remains the same during
the normal state. Note that here we assume that the deposit guarantee is externally
funded. This is in line with most deposit insurance schemes, where deposit insurance is
government guaranteed, with minimal ex-ante fees. This assumption is also in line with
the UK’s Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) which envisages an ex-post
‘pay-as-you-go’ levy on the banking system to recover the costs of deposit insurance, sup-
plemented by borrowing from the government in case large payouts become necessary.
For example, following the default of five relatively large banks in 2008 which necessi-
tated payouts to nearly 4 million depositors, the government provided loan facilities of
approximately £20 billion to the FSCS. Under the terms of the loan, only the interest
on the loan is payable with any recoveries offset against the principal loan amount.3
Using Proposition 13, we can calculate the expected pay-off of depositors.
Proposition 14. Expected pay-off of the depositors when the bank does not participate
in the interbank market and is protected by deposit insurance is -
ΠNIBDI =
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
[(ω + x) + (1− ω − x)R] + γ
+
(
1
2
− γ
2
)[
(ω − x) + (1− ω + x) · 2x+ (1− ω − x)R
1− ω + x
]
=R(1− ω − x) + ω + x− (1− ω − x)(R− 1)γ
3According to the HM Treasury, “The Treasury’s loans to the FSCS attract interest, consistent with
state aid rules set by the European Commission. State aid rules ensure that interventions by national
governments do not distort competition or trade within the EU, and so help to promote a level-playing
field across Europe for financial services.” Therefore, it is likely that without the EU restrictions, the
loans would not have attracted any interest. There terms of the loan are due to be reviewed in 2012,
with the aim of agreeing on a ‘credible and affordable loan repayment schedule for the £20 billion of
legacy costs’.
73
In addition, the expected cost of deposit insurance is -
CNIBDI = (1− ω − x)(1− r)γ
= ΠNIBDI − ΠNIB
Now, considering Proposition 9 with deposit insurance.
Proposition 15. The depositor’s payoff in different states of the world when the bank
participates in the interbank market and is protected by deposit insurance is as follows -
Liquidity State Other Region Probability c1 c2
High Liquidity No Crisis
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
(1− γ) 1 R
(ω + x) Crisis
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
γ
1
Contagion: Bank Run, deposit insurance pays out
Low Liquidity No Crisis
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
(1− γ) 1 R
(ω − x) Crisis (1
2
− γ
2
)
γ 1 x+(1−ω)R
1−ω+x < R
Crisis γ
1
Bank Run, deposit insurance pays out
Once again, the existence of deposit insurance reduces depositors loss during the
crisis state since they now receive c1 = 1 > ω + (1 − ω)r. Note that the gain from
deposit insurance is marginally higher when banks participate in the interbank market
since in the absence of deposit insurance, the banks liquidation value during the crisis
state is lower when participating in the interbank market. This is driven by the fact that
banks optimally invest less in the liquid asset (ω) when participating in the interbank
market vis-a-vis when not participating in the interbank market (ω + x), reducing their
liquidation values.
As before, participation in the interbank market exposes the bank to contagion and a
crisis in the other region results in a run on the bank in the high liquidity demand state.
However, with deposit insurance, depositors still get c1 = 1 > ω + (1 − ω)r, depositors
payoff in the absence of deposit insurance. Using Proposition 15, we can calculate the
expected pay-off of depositors.
Proposition 16. Expected pay-off of the depositors when the bank participates in the
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interbank market and is protected by deposit insurance is -
ΠIBDI =
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
(1− γ) [(ω + x) + (1− ω − x)R] +
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
γ
+
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
(1− γ) [(ω − x) + (1− ω + x)R] + γ
+
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
γ
[
(ω − x) + (1− ω + x) · x+ (1− ω)R
1− ω + x
]
=ω + (1− ω)R− 3
2
(1− ω)(R− 1)γ + 1
2
(1− ω)(R− 1)γ2
In addition, the expected cost of deposit insurance is -
CIBDI =
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
γ(1− ω)(1− r) + γ(1− ω)(1− r)
=
3
2
(1− ω)(1− r)γ − 1
2
(1− ω)(1− r)γ2
= ΠIBDI − ΠIB
Overall from Propositions 14 and 16, it is clear that for every level of γ, ΠIB −ΠNIB
is strictly greater with deposit insurance. Therefore, the threshold level of γ up to which
depositors find it optimal for banks to participate in the interbank market is greater in
the presence of deposit insurance.
Proposition 17. The critical level of γ is higher with deposit insurance, i.e. γDI > γ∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.7
Figure 3 shows that in the presence of deposit insurance, depositors’ expected gain
from participating in the interbank market is positive for all γ < γDI (dashed line).
Thus for all such γ depositors prefer to deposit their endowment with the bank that
participates in the interbank market and offers the deposit contract (c1 = 1, c2 = R) in
the ‘normal’ state of the world. Although this exposes the depositors to the crisis state
in the other region, deposit insurance guarantees that the depositors get c1 = 1 in the
crisis state. Since banks are competitive in our setting, in order to attract deposits, they
are forced to participate in the interbank market and offer depositors deposit contracts
(c1 = 1, c2 = R) in the ‘normal’ state of the world.
In contrast, in the absence of deposit insurance, depositors gain from participation in
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Figure 3: Expected Gain from Participating in the Interbank Market with and without deposit insurance.
the interbank market only for γ < γ∗ (solid line). This is because depositors now only
receive the liquidation value during the crisis state, i.e. c1 < 1 in the crisis state. Thus, for
γ∗ > γ > γDI , banks optimally participate in the interbank market only in the presence
of deposit insurance, i.e. deposit insurance incentives banks to form interconnections
which banks would otherwise not have formed.
Intuitively, in our model, deposit insurance acts as a state contingent cash transfer
from the government to the depositors through the banking system. During the crisis
state, depositors loss is limited to c1 = 1 as opposed to the liquidation value of the
bank where c1 < 1. This incentivises depositors to take on greater risk as they do
not internalise the cost of providing this insurance creating a wedge between social and
private optimality.
Proposition 18. For γ∗ < γ < γDI , banks participation in the interbank market is
socially sub-optimal.
Proof. See Appendix A.8
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Figure 4: Expected Depositor Pay-off under (i) no interbank market; (ii) interbank market with deposit
insurance; and (iii) interbank market with deposit insurance taking into account the expected
cost of insurance.
In order to compare the welfare effects of deposit insurance, we need to explicitly take
into account the cost to the government of providing this insurance. More formally, for
γ∗ > γ > γDI , we need to compare the expected depositor payoff when the bank partici-
pates in the interbank market taking into account the expected cost to the government
of providing deposit insurance, i.e. ΠIBDI − CIBDI with the expected depositor payoff in
the absence of deposit insurance when the bank does not participate in the interbank
market, i.e. ΠNIB.
Proposition 18 formally shows that ΠNIB > ΠIBDI−CIBDI , but more intuitively it is easy
to see from Figure 4 that participation in the interbank market is socially suboptimal
for any γ > γ∗. The solid line represents the expected depositor payoff in the absence of
deposit insurance when the bank does not participate in the interbank market (ΠNIB)
while the dashed line shows the expected depositor payoff when the bank participates in
the interbank market and the depositor is protected by deposit insurance (ΠIBDI). Finally,
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the dot-dashed line represents the expected depositor payoff when the bank participates
in the interbank market taking into account the expected cost to the government of
providing deposit insurance (ΠIBDI − CIBDI ).
The key thing to note here is that the once the cost of deposit insurance is taken
into account, the expected depositor payoff from participating in the interbank market is
equal to the depositor payoff in the absence of deposit insurance, i.e. ΠIBDI −CIBDI = ΠIB.
This follows directly from Proposition 16, but intuitively, since deposit insurance in our
model is essentially a state contingent transfer from the government to the depositors, if
its costs are properly taken into account, it is no coincidence that the depositors gain is
exactly offset by the governments cost of providing this insurance.
Now it is easy to see that for all γ∗ < γ < γDI , the benefits of participating in
the interbank market after accounting for the cost of deposit insurance is less than the
benefits of not participating in the interbank market (note that from Propositions 14,
ΠNIB = ΠNIBDI − CNIBDI ). Therefore, socially it is not optimal for banks to participate in
the interbank for all γ > γ∗. In other words, deposit insurance creates a wedge between
the socially optimal γ∗ and the privately optimal γDI .
Systemically Important Financial Institutions
While deposit insurance is an example of an explicit market friction that can result
in a wedge between private and social optimality of network formation, the existence of
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) is an example of an implicit market
friction that can result in suboptimal network formation. While there is no consensus on
the precise definition of a SIFI, in general terms they can be defined as institutions whose
disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness,
would cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity.4
Such institutions benefit from an implicit government guarantee that they will not
be allowed to fail and in the event of a crisis, they will be bailed out. Interestingly, one
of the ‘criteria’ for being a SIFI is their interconnectedness. Therefore, in the context of
our model, if we assume that the bank decides to participate in the interbank market
and forms a network, it will be classified as a SIFI. In this setting, it is clear that the
optimal strategy for the depositor and the bank would be to participate in the interbank
4See Financial Stability Board (2010, 2011)
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market and form a network, irrespective of the crisis probability.
This result stems from the fact that the SIFI status ensures that during the crisis
state, the bank benefits from a government bailout and can continue to function. The
key difference from deposit insurance is that when the crisis state materialises, deposit
insurance guarantees that in the event of insolvency, depositors get at least c1 = 1 at
t = 1 when the bank fails. However, in the case of a SIFI, the bank is not allowed to
fail and receives government support to continue operating as normal and honour all
its commitments, including the deposit contract (c1 = 1, c2 = R). Furthermore, since
there is no insolvency, there is no possibility of a crisis state and therefore no contagion
channel.
This implies that our model is restricted to the normal state of the world, with zero
probability of the crisis state. Therefore in the case of a SIFI, the bank and the depositors
will always find it privately optimal to form a network irrespective of probability of a
crisis.
Underestimation of γ
Market frictions such as deposit insurance and the existence of SIFIs can result in ex-
cessive interconnections even in cases where the probability of crisis is correctly measured.
The other source of excessive and sub-optimal network formation is the underestimation
of crisis probability, γ. Such underestimation can stem from a variety of sources.
There is an extensive literature on disaster myopia - misperception of the probability
of rare events that arises from a set of heuristics commonly used to form judgements
under uncertainty. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) highlight the so called ‘availability
heuristic’, which states that agents base probabilistic assessments on the ease with which
an event can be brought to mind: how recently it has occurred, how severe are its effects
and how personal is the experience.
Car crashes are the classic example. These often arise from disaster myopia, as drivers
systematically under-estimate the probability of a pile-up and drive too fast. The longer
the period since the last crash, the greater the risk-taking. After a lengthy stretch of clear
motorway, risk appetite may become too healthy, and risk-taking too great, relative to
the true probability of disaster. In other words, drivers are disaster-myopic. Kunreuther,
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Ginsberg, Miller, Sagi, Slovic, Borkan, and Katz (1978) conducted a widely cited study
of disaster protection. As described in Kunreuther (1996), a 1974 survey of more than
1,400 homeowners in hurricane-prone areas of the US found that only 22% of respondents
had voluntarily adopted any protective measures. Haldane (2011) discusses the role of
such biases in the context of the financial crisis.
Given that before the recent financial crisis, bank runs were not seen in the UK for
over 140 years and in Western Europe for the last 15 years, it is possible that such
heuristic biases could have result in the underestimation of the probability of the crisis.
In the context of our model, this underestimation of γ would have resulted in excessive
interconnectedness between banks.
5 Conclusion
In order to study the role of market frictions that can result in the excessive inter-
connectedness that was seen during the crisis, we develop a simplified model of financial
contagion. Departing from the literature which generally models contagion as an exoge-
nous perturbation of the system, our model explicitly take into account the crisis state
of the world. This allows us to endogenise the network formation decision with banks’
recognising the risk of contagion when forming a network. We model the decision to
form a network as an optimising behaviour of banks, where they balance the benefit of
forming a network against the cost of contagion.
We use this framework to study how various market frictions can create a wedge
between the socially optimal and the privately optimal threshold for network formation,
resulting in excessive interconnectedness of the financial system. While such suboptimal
network formation can arise from the several sources that can lead to the underestimation
of the crisis probability, our results suggest that even in cases where the probability of
crisis is perfectly observed, regulatory intervention in the form of deposit insurance and
the existence of systemically important financial institutions can result in socially sub-
optimal network formation and excessive interconnectedness in equilibrium.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proposition 5
When not participating in the interbank market, the bank optimally holds y = ω + x
of the liquid asset.
Clearly, given the opportunity cost of the liquid asset, banks do not optimally hold
liquid asset of size greater than ω + x.5 But suppose holds y = ω + x −  of the liquid
asset, where  → 0. We show that given assumption 1, such a deviation is not optimal
and the bank optimally holds y = ω + x of the liquid asset.
First consider the high liquidity demand case, i.e. ψ = ω + x. Since the bank only
holds y = ω + x −  of the liquid asset, in order to pay ω + x of impatient depositors
c1 = 1 at date t = 1, it has to liquidate l =

r
of the liquid asset. Assuming that the bank
can do so without causing a run on the bank, it can no longer pay patient depositors
c2 = R at date t = 2.
c2 =
(
1− ω − x+ − 
r
)
R
1− ω − x
= R− R
1− ω − x
(1
r
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss due to liquidation
Next, we consider the low liquidity demand case, i.e. ψ = ω − x. After paying out
impatient depositors c1 = 1 at date t = 1, the bank has surplus cash of 2x− . However,
this surplus cash is now less compared to the case where the bank holds y = ω+x of the
liquid asset. Therefore,
c2 =
2x− + (1− ω − x+ )R
1− ω + x
=
2x+ (1− ω − x)R
1− ω + x︸ ︷︷ ︸
c2 when y = ω + x
+
(R− 1)
1− ω + x︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gain due to smaller y
5Note that the bank can increase its liquidation value during the crisis state by holding more of the
liquid asset. However, since by assumption all consumers are impatient and withdraw their deposits at
t = 1, the bank will always go bust unless it only holds liquid assets - in which case it becomes redundant.
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Comparing the loss and the gain, taking into account the ex-post distribution of
patient and impatient depositors, we can show that the loss due to liquidation outweighs
the gain due to lower opportunity cost of investing in the liquid asset.
(1− ω − x) · R
1− ω − x
(1
r
− 1
)
> (1− ω + x) · (R− 1)
1− ω + x
=⇒ R
(1
r
− 1
)
> (R− 1)
=⇒ r < R
2R− 1
which is true by Assumption 1.
A.2 Corollary 3
In the low liquidity demand state with no interbank market, 1 < c2 < R, where
c2 =
2x+(1−ω−x)R
1−ω+x
c2 > 1
=⇒ 2x+ (1− ω − x)R
1− ω + x > 1
=⇒ 2x+ (1− ω − x)R > 1− ω + x
=⇒ (1− ω − x)(R− 1) > 0
Since (1− ω − x) > 0 and R > 1 =⇒ c2 > 1.
c2 < R
=⇒ 2x+ (1− ω − x)R
1− ω + x < R
=⇒ 2x+ (1− ω − x)R < (1− ω + x)R
=⇒ x < R
Since x < 1 and R > 1 =⇒ c2 < R.
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A.3 Proposition 8
When participating in the interbank market, the bank optimally holds y = ω of the
liquid asset and exchanges interbank deposits of size x.
We show this in two stages. First, we show that the bank hold just enough liquidity
(in the form of investment in the liquid asset and interbank deposits) to pay impatient
depositors c1 = 1 at date t = 1 during ‘normal ’ times. Next, we show that banks find it
optimal to hold this liquidity in the form of ω of the liquid asset and interbank deposits
of size x.
Given the opportunity cost of liquid assets, it is obvious that the bank would not hold
liquidity greater than ω + x, the demand from depositors in the high liquidity demand
state. But suppose they hold less. They can do this either by holding smaller interbank
deposits or by investing less in the liquid asset. We consider both cases in turn.
Case 1(a): Suppose the bank invests y = ω in the liquid asset and holds interbank
deposits of size x − , where  → 0. We can show that such a deviation is not optimal
and banks are better off holding interbank deposits of size x. Since interbank deposits
disappear during the crisis state, their size does not matter in such states and it is
sufficient to compare the payoffs during ‘normal ’ times.
Suppose the bank faces high liquidity demand, i.e. ψ = ω + x and has to meet the
withdrawal demand of ω+x from impatient depositors at t = 1. The bank holds ω of the
liquid asset and can withdraw the interbank deposit of x− . This leaves the bank with a
deficit of  which it must meet by liquidating a fraction l = 
r
of the long asset. However,
due to early liquidation of the long asset, the bank can no longer pay date 2 depositors
c2 = R. At date 2, the bank gets (1 − ω − r )R from its remaining long assets and has
to pay (x− )R for the interbank deposits and meet withdrawal demand of (1−w− x).
This implies that
c2 =
(
1− ω − 
r
− (x− ))R
(1− ω − x)
= R− R
1− ω − x
(1
r
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss due to liquidation
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Clearly, this is decreasing in  and the bank can get c2 = R if it sets  = 0.
Next, when the bank faces low liquidity demand, i.e. ψ = ω−x, it has a cash surplus
of  at date 1, after paying out x−  for interbank deposits and (ω− x) to the impatient
depositors. At date 2, it uses this surplus cash, (1−ω)R return from the long asset, and
(x− )R from interbank deposits to pay (1− ω + x) of patient depositors. This implies
that
c2 =
+ (1− ω)R + (x− )R
(1− ω + x)
= R − (R− 1)
1− ω + x︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss due to cash surplus
Once again, this is decreasing in  and the bank finds it optimal to set  = 0 and increase
c2 = R. Therefore, given y = ω holdings of the liquid asset, the bank optimally holds
interbank deposit of size x.
Case 1(b): Suppose instead the bank invests y = ω−  in the liquid asset and holds
interbank deposits of size x. During ‘normal ’ times, the analysis remains the same as
above. However, since the bank now holds only y = ω− of the liquid asset, its liquidation
value decreases. During the crisis state, as well as in the high liquidity demand state
when there is a run on the bank, the banks liquidation value,
c1 = (ω − ) + (1− ω + )r
= ω + (1− ω)r −(1− r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss due to smaller y
Therefore, the bank can increase its liquidation value by setting  = 0. Finally, consider
the case where the bank faces low liquidity demand, i.e. ψ = ω − x and there is a crisis
in the other region. Interbank deposits disappear and the bank has surplus cash of x− 
at date 1 after paying out c1 = 1 to (ω − x) impatient depositors. At date 2, it uses this
surplus cash and (1 − ω + )R return from the long asset to pay (1 − ω + x) of patient
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depositors. This implies,
c2 =
(x− ) + (1− ω + )R
(1− ω + x)
=
x+ (1− ω)R
(1− ω + x) +
(R− 1)
1− ω + x︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gain due to smaller y
Although the bank can increase c2 in this case, it is easy to see that for all γ <
1
2
,
in expectation this gain is less than the loss during the no crisis state. Therefore, banks
cannot do better by holding less liquidity, either by holding smaller interbank deposits
or by investing less in the liquid asset.
We now show that banks find it optimal to hold this liquidity in the form of ω of the
liquid asset and interbank deposits of size x.
Case 2(a): Suppose the bank holds ω− of the liquid assets and interbank deposits
of size x+. When the bank faces high liquidity demand, the cash flows match up during
normal times and c1 = 1 and c2 = R. However, during the low liquidity demand state,
the bank has a liquidity shortfall of 2, even during normal times - (ω − ) cash inflow
from the investment in the liquid asset vs the outflow of (x+ ) on account of interbank
deposits and (ω − x) to pay impatient depositors. The bank is forced to liquidate l = 2
r
of the long asset. This implies that
c2 =
(
1− ω + − 2
r
+ (x+ )
)
R
(1− ω + x)
= R− 2R
1− ω + x
(1
r
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss due to liquidation
Clearly, this is decreasing in  and the bank can get c2 = R if it sets  = 0. During the
crisis state in the other region, the interbank deposits disappear, but there is no bank
run in the low liquidity demand case and the bank has a smaller cash surplus of (x− )
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at date 1. Therefore,
c2 =
(x− ) + (1− ω + )R
(1− ω + x)
=
x+ (1− ω)R
(1− ω + x) +
(R− 1)
1− ω + x︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gain due to smaller y
As in Case 1(b), although the bank can increase c2 in this case, for all γ <
1
2
, in
expectation this gain is less than the loss during the no crisis state. Finally, in the event
of a bank run, the banks liquidation value falls.
c1 = (ω − ) + (1− ω + )r
= ω + (1− ω)r −(1− r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss due to smaller y
Therefore, the bank is better off with  = 0.
Case 2(b): Suppose the bank holds ω+  of the liquid assets and interbank deposits
of size x−. As before, during normal times, the cash flows match up in the high liquidity
demand state. But during the low liquidity demand state, the bank has surplus liquidity
of 2 - (ω+ ) cash inflow from the investment in the liquid asset vs the outflow of (x− )
on account of interbank deposits and (ω − x) to pay impatient depositors. This implies
that
c2 =
2+ (1− ω − )R + (x− )R
(1− ω + x)
= R − 2(R− 1)
(1− ω + x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss due to cash surplus
This is decreasing in  and the bank can get c2 = R if it sets  = 0.
During the crisis state in the other region, the interbank deposits disappear, but there
is no bank run in the low liquidity demand case and the bank has a surplus cash of (x+)
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at date 1. Therefore,
c2 =
(x+ ) + (1− ω − )R
(1− ω + x)
=
x+ (1− ω)R
(1− ω + x) −
(R− 1)
1− ω + x︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss due to cash surplus
Once again we see that the optimal strategy for the bank is to set  = 0, i.e. hold y = ω
of the liquid asset and exchange interbank deposits of size x
However, in the event of a bank run, the liquidation value of the bank increases when
it holds y = ω +  of the liquid asset.
c1 = (ω + ) + (1− ω − )r
= ω + (1− ω)r +(1− r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gain due to larger y
Based on this, we can compute the expected gain during liquidation and the expected
loss when there is no bank run.
Expected gain during bank runs:
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
γ(1− r) + γ(1− r)
Expected loss when no bank run:
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
(1− γ)2(R− 1) +
(
1
2
− γ
2
)
γ(R− 1)
As long as 1−r
R−1 <
γ2−γ+2
γ(1−γ) , the expected loss is greater than the expected gain and
banks find it optimal to hold ω of the liquid asset and interbank deposits of size x. The
above condition is relatively weak and holds for most parameter values. Intuitively, it
says that the probability of the crisis should not be too high relative to the liquidation
cost and the return of the long term assets. For practical purposes, it is only violated
when the liquidation cost is close to 0 and/or R is very close to 1 and at the same time,
the probability of the crisis is very high.
A.4 Corollary 4
If Assumption 2 holds, contagion results in a run on the bank during the high liquidity
demand state.
In the case of a crisis in region B, the region A bank is forced to liquidate a fraction
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l = x
r
of the long asset to meet the withdrawal demand of ψ = ω + x during the high
liquidity state and pay impatient depositors c1 = 1. Note that this implicitly assumes
that l ≤ (1−w). In case l > (1−w), the bank cannot pay c1 = 1 to date one depositors
even after it liquidates all its long assets. It pays c1 < 1 and therefore goes bust.
Assuming this does not hold, the bank has (1 − ω − l) of the long asset left, with
which it has to pay (1− ω − x) patient depositors. Thus,
(1− ω − l)R = (1− ω − x)c2
=⇒ c2 =
(1− ω − x
r
)R
1− ω − x
For there to be a run on the bank, we need to show,
c2 < 1
=⇒ (1− ω − x
r
)R < 1− ω − x
=⇒ (1− ω)R− xR
r
< 1− ω − x
=⇒ (1− ω)(R− 1) < x
(
R
r
− 1
)
=⇒ x > (1− ω)(R− 1)
R
r
− 1
Given Assumption 2, this is always true.
A.5 Proposition 11
ΠIB − ΠNIB is decreasing in crisis probability γ, i.e. the benefits of participating in
the interbank market are decreasing in γ.
Using Propositions 7 and 10, we have
ΠIB − ΠNIB =ω + (1− ω)R− 3
2
(1− ω)(R− r)γ + 1
2
(1− ω)(R− r)γ2
−R(1− ω − x) + ω + x− (1− ω − x)(R− r)γ
=x(R− 1)− 1
2
(1− ω + 2x)(R− r)γ + 1
2
(1− ω)(R− r)γ2
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Taking the partial derivative with respect to γ,
∂
∂γ
(ΠIB − ΠNIB) = −1
2
(1− ω + 2x)(R− r) + (1− ω)(R− r)γ
Now,
∂
∂γ
(ΠIB − ΠNIB) < 0 if γ < 1− ω + 2x
2(1− ω)
This is always true for all γ < 1
2
, implying that ΠIB − ΠNIB is decreasing in the crisis
probability γ.
A.6 Proposition 12
There exists a γ∗ such that ΠIB > ΠNIB for γ < γ∗ and ΠIB < ΠNIB for γ > γ∗.
We solve for γ∗ such that ΠIB − ΠNIB = 0.
ΠIB − ΠNIB =x(R− 1)− 1
2
(1− ω + 2x)(R− r)γ + 1
2
(1− ω)(R− r)γ2 = 0
Solving for γ∗, we have
γ∗ =
1
2
(1− ω + 2x)(R− r)−
√
1
4
(1− ω + 2x)2(R− r)2 − 2(1− ω)(R− r)x(R− 1)
(1− ω)(R− r)
Using Proposition 11, it is clear that ΠIB > ΠNIB for γ < γ∗ and ΠIB < ΠNIB for γ > γ∗.
A.7 Proposition 17
The critical level of γ is higher with deposit insurance, i.e. γDI > γ∗.
From the proof of Proposition 12, we have the gain from participating in the interbank
market as a function of γ in the absence of deposit insurance.
ΠIB − ΠNIB = x(R− 1)− 1
2
(1− ω + 2x)(R− r)γ + 1
2
(1− ω)(R− r)γ2
Similarly, we can calculate the gain from participating in the interbank market as a
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function of γ in the presence of deposit insurance.
ΠIBDI − ΠNIBDI = x(R− 1)−
1
2
(1− ω + 2x)(R− 1)γ + 1
2
(1− ω)(R− 1)γ2
Comparing these two equations, we can show that,
(ΠIBDI − ΠNIBDI ) > (ΠIB − ΠNIB)
=⇒ (ΠIBDI − ΠNIBDI )− (ΠIB − ΠNIB) > 0
=⇒ 1
2
(1− ω + 2x)(1− r)γ − 1
2
(1− ω)(1− r)γ2 > 0
=⇒ (1− ω + 2x) > (1− ω)γ
Since 0 < γ < 1 and x > 0, this condition holds.
This implies that for every level of γ, the gains from participating in the interbank
market are greater in the presence of deposit insurance. This in turn implies that γDI >
γ∗.
Using the expression for ΠIBDI − ΠNIBDI , we can explicitly solve for the value of γDI .
Solving, we have
γDI =
2x
1− ω
Note that we ignore the other root γDI = 1 as we are interested in small γ.
A.8 Proposition 18
For γ∗ < γ < γDI , banks participation in the interbank market is socially sub-optimal.
For γ∗ < γ < γDI , in the absence of deposit insurance the bank optimally does not
participate in the interbank market and the expected depositor payoff is ΠNIB (Proposi-
tion 7). On the other hand, with deposit insurance, it is privately optimal for the bank to
participate in the interbank market and the expected depositor payoff is ΠIBDI (Proposi-
tion 16). In order to assess the social optimality of participation in the interbank market,
we need to explicitly take into account the costs of deposit insurance, CIBDI . Participation
is socially sub-optimal when ΠNIB > ΠIBDI − CIBDI .
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From Proposition 16, we have CIBDI = Π
IB
DI−ΠIB. Substituting, it is sufficient to show
that ΠNIB > ΠIB. This always holds for all γ > γ∗ (Proposition 12). Therefore, for
γ∗ < γ < γDI , banks participation in the interbank market is socially sub-optimal.
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Abstract
A substantial body of research suggests that it is difficult to account for
all of the asset price volatility in terms of news. This paper attempts to
explain the excess volatility puzzle as a consequence of competitive interaction
between market participants. We develop a model of competitive interaction
in the presence of noisy, but verifiable information. Our model shows that
in the presence of competitive pressures, market participants find it optimal
to act prematurely on unverified, noisy information. This premature reaction
leads to lower total profits and excess market volatility in equilibrium. Our
model also suggests that the spike in volatility at the closing time of the
market can be modelled as a direct consequence of premature trading.
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1 Introduction
One of the enduring puzzles in the finance literature is excess volatility. Shiller (1981)
showed that equity markets are more volatile than what fundamentals, i.e. changes in the
level of dividends and interest rates, suggest. Although Kleidon (1986) cast some doubt
on Shiller’s findings, there exists accumulating evidence that not all asset price movements
reflect changes in fundamental values. LeRoy and Porter (1981), Roll (1984, 1988),
Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro (1985), West (1988), Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989)
and Ebrahim and Mathur (2001) amongst several others have all documented a significant
amount of volatility that cannot be explained by changes in fundamentals. After an
extensive survey, Gilles and LeRoy (1991) conclude “this finding of excess volatility is
robust and is difficult to explain within the representative consumer, frictionless market
model”.
In this paper, we attempt to explain the excess volatility puzzle as a consequence of
competitive interaction between market participants. We assume that the initial infor-
mation received by market participants is very noisy, often taking the form of a rumour
or speculation. This could be attributed to information uncertainty a` la Zhang (2006)
and Epstein and Schneider (2008).
Ideally, market participants should wait to verify the initial noisy information before
trading on it. However, we show that in the presence of competitive pressures, market
participants, fearful of losing out on the trading opportunity, find it optimal to act
prematurely on unverified information. This result stems from the fact that each market
participant is afraid that if he does not act quickly enough, he will miss out on the
opportunity. We show that this premature reaction leads to excess market volatility and
lower expected profits in equilibrium.
Furthermore, high frequency data has shown systematic patterns in the dynamics
of intraday volatility. In particular, there is strong evidence suggesting that market
volatility spikes as the market closing time approaches. We show that this spike in
volatility at the closing time of the market can be modelled a direct outcome of premature
trading. Intuitively, as the market closing time draws near, market participants tend to
increase premature trading out of fear of not being able to use the information at hand.
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We assume that if they wait till the next trading day, the information is revealed to the
market and ceases to be a profitable trading opportunity. Thus as the market nears its
closing time, the time left to execute the trade decreases. As a result, market participants
tend to trade even more on unverified noisy initial information, resulting in the spike in
market volatility during the end of the trading day.
We model competitive interaction between market participants in a three-period ra-
tional expectations equilibrium (REE) model, where informed traders trade against a
price setting competitive market maker, in presence of a noise trader. Informed traders
initially receive a noisy signal which they can verify over time. This evolving nature of
information plays a key role in our setting. Informed traders can either trade early on
unverified, noisy signal or they can choose to wait and trade on verified information.
The informed traders’ payoff from either action is contingent on the actions of other
informed traders. The uncertainty surrounding the actions of other traders leads to coor-
dination failure and lower profits in equilibrium. The intuition behind the coordination
failure in our model is similar to the one employed in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003).
While in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), the uncertainty surrounding the action of in-
formed traders (rational arbitragers in their setting) results in the persistence of asset
price bubbles, in our model it leads to premature trading and excess volatility.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 places our paper in the existing
academic literature. In Section 3, we describe the basic setup of our model. We then
solve the model in Section 4 for the baseline one informed trader case, followed by two
and N informed traders respectively. Section 5 outlines the implication of our results for
total expected profits of the informed traders and market volatility. We also look at the
impact of market closing in this section. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Our paper is related to the extensive market microstructure literature on price for-
mation in the presence of asymmetric information. Asymmetric information is generally
modelled in the form of informed traders – agents with private information unavailable
to the wider market. These informed traders are distinct from insiders, usually defined as
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corporate officers with fiduciary obligations to the shareholders. Informed traders trade
in order to profit from their private information. Noise traders are liquidity motivated,
smoothing their inter-temporal consumption stream through portfolio adjustment. Bage-
hot (1971) provides a detailed discussion of the trading motivations and the resultant
distinction between noise traders who possess no special informational advantages and
are primarily liquidity motivated and informed traders with private information who try
to maximise profits.
In these models, the informed traders’ trade against the price setting competitive
market maker, in the presence of noise traders. The market maker makes losses on the
trades with the informed traders, but recoups these loses on trades with the noise traders,
making zero profit on average. Sequential trade models such as Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987) show that a rational market maker will quote regret
free ex-post bid and ask prices which reflect the expected value of the security given the
observed order. Implicit in the bid-ask formulation is the assumption that the market
maker takes into account the direction of trade and the set of public information includes
all information at that time, including the knowledge of the trade itself. The bid-ask
spread is therefore increasing in information asymmetry and the degree of asset value
volatility. The market maker trades off the reduction in losses to the informed trader
from the wider spread against the opportunity cost in terms of profits from trading with
uninformed noise traders with reservation prices.
Our modelling strategy is similar to the one employed in the seminal Kyle (1985)
paper. In the static version of the Kyle (1985) model, the market maker sets the price
after observing the aggregate order flow – a batch clearing model. The market maker sets
the price equal to his best estimate, given his belief about the insiders trading strategy.
Kyle derives a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy where the informed trader’s
profit is increasing in his informational advantage and market depth. Intuitively, greater
market depth implies that an additional order from the informed trader would not lead
to a large change in prices, allowing the informed trader to trade more aggressively on
his private information. Kyle (1985) also extends this static model to a dynamic setting
focussing on the profit maximising temporal decision of the informed trader. In the
dynamic version of the model, if the insider takes a larger position on the early periods,
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his early profits increase but this comes at a cost of revealing his private information
to the market. As a result, the prices in the later trading rounds worsen. The optimal
strategy for the informed trader is to exploit the informational advantage over time by
hiding behind the noise traders.
Several papers check the robustness of the Kyle (1985) set-up. Biais and Rochet
(1997) demonstrate that multiple equilibria exist in a discrete setting. Rochet and Vila
(1994) consider a setting where the informed trader observes the amount of noise trading
and show that the expected profits stay the same. Rochet and Vila (1994) show that the
equilibrium in their setting coincides with Kyle (1989) where informed traders submit
demand schedules. Vives (1995) shows that the market clearing process, where a compet-
itive risk neutral market maker submits demand schedules based on public information
and the informed trader submits market orders is equivalent to the classic Kyle (1985)
set-up. Bagnoli, Viswanathan, and Holden (2001) provide a comprehensive overview of
the existence of linear equilibria in static Kyle (1985)-type models.
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) generalise Kyle’s model to incorporate competition
amongst informed traders. They show that such competition results in high trading
volumes and rapid revelation of private information, which is compatible with strong-
form market efficiency. Relative to Kyle’s model, markets are more efficient, volumes
are higher and the profits of insiders are much lower. They argue, in the same spirit
as Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) that insider trading may not be a concern in the
presence of competition amongst agents. However, they do not allow for informational
gains from waiting which is usually the case in financial markets. Moreover, in practice,
we hardly observe strong-form market efficiency their conclusion envisages. By allowing
for the noisy information available to the informed traders, our model is more realistic and
produces different results, which suggests that enhanced competition may hinder price
discovery and lead to excess market volatility. In this regard, our paper complements
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992).
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) also develop a model of strategic play by informed and
uninformed traders and allow for the uninformed traders to have discretion as to which
time period they would trade in. They show that this can result in concentrated bouts
of trading, similar to the spike in volatility at the start and close of trading. While this
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finding is consistent with our model, Admati and Pfleiderer approach excess volatility
from concentrated-trading stemming from the strategic behaviour of noise traders while
we focus on the behaviour of informed traders who strategically decide whether to trade
early on unverified information or wait and verify the accuracy of the information.
Our paper also contributes to the growing strand of recent literature which studies
the effect of unverified initial information or ambiguous interpretations of incoming infor-
mation on asset returns and volatility. For example, Barron and Karpoff (2004) find that
trading volume reactions to public announcements are most sensitive to announcement
precision among low-transaction cost securities and in low-cost trading regimes. More
recently,Chen and Zhao (2012) find that the informed trading effect is both independent
of and stronger than that of information uncertainty in determining price momentum.
Lu, Chen, and Liao (2010) also examine the effects of information uncertainty and infor-
mation asymmetry on corporate bond yield spreads.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the spike in volatility at the closing
time of the market. Research based on high frequency data suggests that returns volatility
varies systemically over the trading day, with Wood, McInish, and Ord (1985) and Harris
(1986) documenting the existence of a distinct ‘U-shaped’ pattern in return volatility over
the trading day. In particular, these papers document spikes in market volatility as the
market closing time approaches. Several other studies such as McInish and Wood (1990a),
Foster and Viswanathan (1990), Niemeyer and Sandas (1994), Aitken, Brown, Buckland,
Izan, and Walter (1996) also document such spikes. In the presence of a lunch break in
the Japanese stock exchange, Andersen, Bollerslev, and Cai (2000) find that the Nikkei
225 index volatility is significantly higher at the opening of the morning and close of the
afternoon session, with an increase in volatility immediately before and after the lunch
break, resulting in two distinct ‘U-shapes’, one in the morning and one in the afternoon.
A number of studies have sought to rationalise this ‘U-shaped’ pattern in intraday
volatility by strategic interaction of asymmetrically informed agents. As discussed above,
the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) model relies on the behaviour of some uninformed
traders who strategically execute their trades in order to minimise their trading costs.
Brock and Kleidon (1992) on the other hand model this as a result of portfolio rebalancing
at trading halts based on the idea that the optimal portfolio is a function of the ability to
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trade. They show that transactions demand at open and close is greater and less elastic
than at other times in the trading day.
Slezak (1994) develops a multi-period model in which market closure delays the res-
olution of uncertainty, threby redistributing risk across time and agents. Since agents
are risk averse in their model, this redistribution affects equilibrium price, altering risk
premia and liquidity cost. This allows them to generate a variety of mean and variance
effect, including those mirroring the observed spike in closing time volatility. Foster and
Viswanathan (1990) analyze the implications of adverse selection in securities markets
for the intertemporal behavior of trading volume, trading costs, and price volatility, when
there is periodic variation in the information advantage of an informed trader. Based
on a variant of the Kyle (1985) model, they show that because the price is an impor-
tant source of information for uninformed liquidity traders, the informed trader has the
greatest advantage when the market first opens; and, the longer the market is closed, the
more significant is the advantage of the informed trader at the opening.
3 Model Setup
We consider a three period model, t = 0, 1, 2, with three types of agents - informed
traders, a noise trader and a market maker. There is a risky asset that pays a liquidating
dividend V at t = 2, where
V =
H with probability
1
2
L with probability 1
2
Let V¯ = 1
2
·H + 1
2
· L denote the expected value of the asset at t = 0.
The asset can be traded at t = 0 and t = 1 via a competitive market maker. The
asset generates a signal s about V, which is observed privately by the informed trader(s)
at t = 0. The signal can be either ‘positive’ (= sH) or ‘negative’ (= sL). The signal,
s(∈ {sH , sL}) is correct with probability λ and wrong with probability 1 − λ. In order
to make the signal informative, we assume λ > 1
2
. Thus, if the informed trader receives
a positive signal, then at t = 2, the asset is worth H with probability λ and L with
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probability 1− λ. Formally, λ is the conditional probability which can be expressed as
λ =
 Pr(V = H, t = 2|s = sH , t = 0)Pr(V = L, t = 2|s = sL, t = 0)
Likewise,
1− λ =
 Pr(V = L, t = 2|s = sH , t = 0)Pr(V = H, t = 2|s = sL, t = 0)
The signal can be verified costlessly, but takes one period to do so. Thus, if the
informed trader decides to verify the signal, he has to wait and trade at period t = 1.
This information structure plays a key role in our model and in the presence of competitive
pressures, leads to premature trading. Informed traders strategically decide whether to
trade immediately based on the noisy signal at t = 0, or wait and verify the signal and
trade at t = 1, at which time the informed trader has perfect information. We assume
that the informed trader submits market order and can only trade once which can be
motivated by high transaction costs.
Following the established literature, we assume that the noise trader submits demand
which can be d or −d with probability 1
2
. This implies that if the informed trader decides
to trade, he can either submit demand d or −d. Any other demand would instantly
reveal his identity to the market maker. We assume noise trader trades at both t = 0
and t = 1.
Following Kyle (1985), trading in our model takes place through a two-step auction
mechanism. The informed and noise traders simultaneously submit market orders which
are observed by the market maker. After observing the demand, the market maker sets
the price and trades the quantity that clears the market. However, unlike the Kyle (1985)
model where the market maker only observes aggregate order flow, we assume a model
of call markets, where the market maker observes individual orders, but not the identity
of the individual submitting the order, i.e. cannot identify whether a particular order
comes from the noise trader or the informed trader.
Effectively, the market maker’s information set is larger than in Kyle (1985), allowing
him to refine his beliefs and set the price more accurately.1 We believe that this formula-
1In our model, the market maker can distinguish between an order {d, d, -d} and {d} while in the
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tion is closer to real world markets than the commonly used Kyle approach of aggregate
order flow. Such models with call markets have been studied in Kyle (1989), Kyle and
Vila (1991) and Rochet and Vila (1994). Corb (1993) and Bagnoli, Viswanathan, and
Holden (2001) analyse equilibria in these types of models. In the appendix, we check
for the robustness of our result and present an alternative version of our model with the
classic Kyle (1985) assumptions.
Finally, the market maker, after observing demand sets the price and clears the mar-
ket. Everyone is risk-neutral and the risk-free rate is zero. The informed traders maximise
expected profit, taking into account the effect of their trades. The price determined by
the market maker is the market maker’s best conjecture of the liquidation value of the
asset, given all his information.
4 Model Solution
We now solve the model for increasing levels of competition - for one informed trader,
for two informed traders and finally, for N informed traders. This allows us to study the
effect of competition on the trading behaviour of market participants.
4.1 One informed trader
As a first step, we solve the model for the ‘baseline case’ of a single informed trader.
The informed trader decides whether to trade early at period t = 0 based on the signal
or to wait and verify the signal and trade later at t = 1. In this case, the informed
trader faces no competitive pressures and trades with the market maker in the presence
of the noise trader. We look for a symmetric, perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBE).
We find that the optimal strategy of the informed trader is to wait and verify the signal
before trading.
Proposition 19. There exists a unique PBE, such that the informed trader will
• buy d assets at t = 1 if he confirmed a positive signal at t = 0
Kyle (1985) model the aggregate demand would be the same, i.e. d.
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• sell d assets at t = 1 if he confirmed a negative signal at t = 0
• never trade at t = 0
Proof. The market maker observes the demand from the noise trader and the informed
trader. Based on the observed demand at t = 0, D0, the market maker sets the price,
P0, equal to his best guess of the liquidation value of the asset.
P0 =

V¯ if D0 = {d}
V¯ if D0 = {−d}
λH + (1− λ)L if D0 = {d, d}
V¯ if D0 = {d,−d}
λL+ (1− λ)H if D0 = {−d,−d}
Note that in this case price does not change at t = 0 (in equilibrium) since the
market maker knows that the informed trader will only trade at t = 1. This is because
the informed trader does not want to reveal his information to the market maker at t = 0.
Hence the last three cases {d, d}, {d,−d} and {−d,−d} are not in equilibrium and the
market maker attributes any demand at t = 0 to noise traders.
At t = 1, we get three cases. If the market maker observes two positive orders, i.e.
D1 = {d, d}, he knows that the informed trader has submitted a +d order and since the
informed trader has perfect information at t = 1, he sets price P1 = H. Conversely,
on observing two negative orders, D1 = {−d,−d}, he sets price P1 = L. Finally, if
he observes one positive and one negative order, i.e. D1 = {d,−d}, he does not know
whether the informed trader submitted +d or −d, and thus the price remains unchanged,
P1 = V¯ . Note that this is the only case where the informed trader can profit from the
information.
P1 =

H if D1 = {d, d}
V¯ if D1 = {d,−d}
L if D1 = {−d,−d}
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Given the market maker’s belief (and the resulting prices), we evaluate the informed
trader’s strategy at t = 0. Assume that the informed trader gets a high signal sH at
t = 0, i.e. V = H at t = 2 with probability λ. The low signal case is analogous.
If the informed trader submits demand +d based on the high signal at t = 0, his profits
depend on the actions of the noise trader. If the noise trader also submits demand +d
(with probability 1
2
), the market maker observes demand D0 = {d, d} and sets the price
equal to the expected profits of the informed trader, λH + (1− λ)L, given the accuracy
of the signal λ. The informed trader makes zero profit in this case. On the other hand,
if the noise trader submits demand −d (again with probability 1
2
), the market maker,
unable to distinguish between the noise and informed trader demand, keeps the price
at V¯ and the informed trader’s expected profit equals λH + (1 − λ)L − V¯ . Thus, the
informed trader profits from trading early at t = 0,
Π0 =
1
2
· 0 + 1
2
(
λH + (1− λ)L− V¯ )
=
1
2
(
λH + (1− λ)L− V¯ )
On the other hand, suppose the informed trader waits to verify his signal and trades at
t = 1. We now get four cases. Suppose the signal is correct (probability λ) and the value
of the asset turns out to be H at t = 2. The informed trader submits demand +d. Like
before, his profits are contingent on the actions of the noise trader. If the noise trader
also submits +d demand (with 1
2
probability), the market maker becomes informed and
the informed trader makes zero profit. If, on the other hand, the noise trader submits
−d demand, the market maker remains uninformed and the informed trader makes a
profit H− V¯ . Conversely, if the signal turns out to be incorrect (probability (1−λ)) and
the asset value turns out to be L, the informed trader submits demand −d. If the noise
trader also submits −d, the informed trader makes zero profit, while if the noise trader
submits d, his profit equals V¯ − L.
Put differently, at t = 1, the informed trader knows V and makes a profit only if the
noise trader trades in the opposite direction (with probability 1
2
). In this case the profit
is H − V¯ = V¯ −L. Thus, the informed trader’s profit from trading on the verified signal
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at t = 1,
Π1 = λ
(1
2
· 0 + 1
2
(
H − V¯ ))+ (1− λ)(1
2
· 0 + 1
2
(
V¯ − L))
=
1
2
(
H − V¯ )
We can see Π1 > Π0 given λ < 1. Therefore the informed trader will always trade at
t = 1.
Proposition 1 implies that in the absence of competitive pressures, the dominant
strategy for the informed trader is to wait and verify the signal. So there is no premature
trading in this case. This makes intuitive sense since in the absence of competition, there
is no incentive to trade earlier than necessary.
To set ideas, we can think of an example where a brokerage house has exclusive access
to some unverified information on a looming merger and acquisition deal between two
companies. The brokerage house is not yet aware of the details of the deal or even whether
the deal would finally materialise. In such a situation, the brokerage house can either
take a bet and trade on its information - in which case it would find it quite difficult to
assess the precise valuation; or alternatively, it can spend some time assessing the details
of the deal (and/or waiting for the terms of the deal to be finalised). Analogous to the
one informed trader case, if the brokerage house was sure that the information would
not become available to the wider market (or to its competitors), then it would prefer to
wait.
The quality of information (or the noise embedded in the signal) plays a critical role
in our model and is the key driver behind the strategic action of the informed trader.
The extent of the advantage from waiting to verify the signal depends on the accuracy
of signal. As the accuracy of information, λ increases, the difference between Π1 and Π0
and hence the advantage of waiting falls. In the extreme, when λ = 1, i.e. the correct
information is available in the first place, there is no reason that the informed trader
postpones his action.
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4.2 Two informed traders
We now introduce competition in the form of a second informed trader. We assume
that the two informed traders receive a common signal at t = 0. Let x denote the
probability that each informed trader trades at period t = 0.
Proposition 20. There exists a unique symmetric PBE, such that the informed traders
will
• with probability x, buy d assets at t = 0 if they receive a positive signal at t = 0
• with probability (1−x), buy d assets at t = 1 if the positive signal is confirmed, else
sell d assets
• with probability x, sell d assets at t = 0 if they receive a negative signal at t = 0
• with probability (1 − x), sell d assets at t = 1 if the negative signal is confirmed,
else buy d assets
where x is the mixed strategy (symmetric) equilibrium,
x =
2λ− 1
4λ− 2λ2 − 1
2
Proof. As before, the market maker observes the demand from the two informed traders
and the noise trader and sets the price. At t = 0,
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P0 =

λH + (1− λ)L if D0 = {d, d, d}
λH + (1− λ)L if D0 = {d, d}
λH + (1− λ)L if D0 = {d, d,−d}
V¯ if D0 = {d}
V¯ if D0 = {d,−d}
V¯ if D0 = {−d}
λL+ (1− λ)H if D0 = {d,−d,−d}
λL+ (1− λ)H if D0 = {−d,−d}
λL+ (1− λ)H if D0 = {−d,−d,−d}
Note that the only profit-relevant case is D0 = {d,−d}, i.e. when only one informed
trader trades and the noise trader trades against the informed trader.
In setting the price at t = 1, the market maker takes into account demand at t = 0.
Since the informed traders can trade only once, the trades that take place in period t = 0
give the market maker valuable information about who is potentially trading in period
t = 1. If the market maker observes three orders in period t = 0, say D0 = {d, d, d}
or D0 = {d, d,−d},2 he knows that both informed traders traded at t = 0. Therefore,
any demand the market maker observes at t = 1 is attributable to the noise trader and
contains no new information and hence there is no price impact.
• If D0 = {d, d, d} or D0 = {d, d,−d}
P1 = P0 = λH + (1− λ)L
• If D0 = {−d,−d, d} or D0 = {−d,−d,−d}
P1 = P0 = λL+ (1− λ)H
On the other hand, if the market maker observes only one order at t = 0, he knows
2Since the signals are correlated, we cannot have the case where one informed trader submits +d
while the other submits −d.
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that both informed traders will be trading at t = 1. In this case, irrespective of the
actions of the noise trader, the informed traders signal is revealed to the market maker.
The market maker sets the price accordingly and hence the informed traders cannot profit
from their information.
• If D0 = {d}
P1 =

H if D1 = {d, d, d}
H if D1 = {d, d,−d}
L if D1 = {−d,−d, d}
L if D1 = {−d,−d,−d}
• If D0 = {−d}
P1 =

H if D1 = {d, d, d}
H if D1 = {d, d,−d}
L if D1 = {−d,−d, d}
L if D1 = {−d,−d,−d}
Finally, when the market maker observes two orders in t = 0, only one informed trader
trades at t = 1 and the actions of the noise trader becomes important. If the market
maker observes D1 = {d, d}, he knows that one of the informed traders has submitted
+d in this period, and since informed traders in period t = 1 have perfect information,
he sets P1 = H. Conversely, if he observes demand D1 = {−d,−d}, he sets P1 = L.
However, in case D1 = {d,−d}, the market maker does not know whether the informed
trader submitted +d or −d and the price remains the same, i.e. P1 = P0.
• If D0 = {d, d}
P1 =

H if D1 = {d, d}
P0 = λH + (1− λ)L if D1 = {d,−d}
L if D1 = {−d,−d}
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• If D0 = {d,−d}
P1 =

H if D1 = {d, d}
V¯ if D1 = {d,−d}
L if D1 = {−d,−d}
• If D0 = {−d,−d}
P1 =

H if D1 = {d, d}
P0 = λL+ (1− λ)H if D1 = {d,−d}
L if D1 = {−d,−d}
Given the prices, we can evaluate each informed trader’s strategy at t = 0. The
intuition behind these equations is the same as in the one informed trader case, only
more complicated because of the additional cases. As before, the informed traders profit
from trading at t = 0,
Π0 = (1− x) · 1
2
· ((λH + (1− λ)L− 1
2
(H + L)
)
=
1
2
(1− x)(λ− 1
2
)(H − L)
On the other hand, if he waits to verify his signal and trades at t = 1,
Π1 = x ·
(1
2
(
λ · 1
2
(H − 1
2
(H + L)) + (1− λ) · 1
2
(
1
2
(H + L)− L))
+
1
2
(
λ · 1
2
(H − λH − (1− λ)L) + (1− λ) · 1
2
(λH + (1− λ)L− L)))
=
1
4
(H − L)x(1
2
+ 2λ(1− λ))
Solving for a mixed strategy equilibrium, we find that the informed trader will trade
at t = 0 with probability x where
x =
2λ− 1
4λ− 2λ2 − 1
2
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Proposition 2 states that with two informed traders, the symmetric equilibrium is
a mixed strategy where the informed traders find it optimal to trade prematurely on
unverified information. In other words, instead of waiting for the information to be
verified at t = 1, informed traders find it optimal to use a mixed strategy and trade
early at t = 0 based on their signal. In our model, the extent of such premature trading
depends on the level of accuracy of information (λ). This reflects the clear trade-off
between taking an early action and postponing the action which can be quantified by
the quality of information. Unlike the case of a single informed trader, informed traders
are no longer able to play a waiting game since the other informed trader can potentially
usurp the benefits from the information by trading early at t = 0.
Our results show that the extent of premature trading is a monotonically increasing
in λ, i.e. ∂x
∂λ
> 0 for λ ∈ (0.5, 1]. This is along expected lines. As λ increases, the initial
signal becomes more and more accurate and the benefits from trading late falls (as the
gains from verification are lower) and thus x is larger. However, note that even if the
λ = 1 and the incentive to trade late disappears, in order to profit from the private
signal, the informed traders still have to utilize a mixed strategy. This is because if both
informed traders trade at t = 0, then the private signal is revealed to the market maker.
It is clear from Propositions 19 and 20 that competition results in premature trading.
In case of only one informed trader, the informed trader finds it optimal to wait and
trades on verified information at t = 1. However, with competition, the informed traders
play a mixed strategy and with probability x trades prematurely at t = 0.
Revisiting our brokerage house example from earlier, we can think of a more realistic
case of two brokerage houses getting involved in the deal. As before, the initial infor-
mation available to both the brokerage houses is noisy. However, unlike the one trader
case where the brokerage house has the luxury of waiting for the details of the deal to
emerge, competition incentivises the brokerage house to act on the information quickly
before its competitor gets a chance to do so. The brokerage houses face a clear tradeoff.
As before they can wait for the details to emerge and ensure that they trade on correct
information, i.e. verify that the deal would actually materialise and confirm its terms.
However, now this waiting entails the risk of the other brokerage house would act first,
thereby cashing in on the opportunity. Therefore, competition incentivises the brokerage
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house to take on more risk and go for it, i.e. trade on the information before it can verify
all the details. This premature trading behaviour is captured in our model by the mixed
strategy symmetric equilibrium x.
This finding is compatible with the aggressive trading result found in Admati and
Pfleiderer (1988) and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) in Kyle type models. However,
the novelty of our approach lies in the fact that our results are driven by the information
structure of the signal. This allows us to model phenomena such as high volatility and
aggressive trading from the perspective of competition among informed traders triggered
by imperfect information.
Note that in deriving our results, we have focussed on the symmetric equilibrium and
ignored the possibility that the two informed traders might be able to coordinate their
actions. In other words, there exists non-symmetric equilibria where one trader always
trades early and the other always trades late. However, since it is difficult to justify the
coordination between traders ex-ante, particularly when we move to a more generalised
model with N traders, following other papers in the literature (e.g. Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2005), we choose to focus on the symmetric equilibrium.
4.3 N informed trader
We can now generalise our model to N > 2 informed traders, each receiving a common
signal at t = 0. This allows us to look at the impact of increasing competition on the
trading behaviour of market participants.
Proposition 21. There exists a unique symmetric PBE, such that the informed traders
will
• with probability x, buy d assets at t = 0 if they receive a positive signal at t = 0
• with probability (1−x), buy d assets at t = 1 if the positive signal is confirmed, else
sell d assets
• with probability x, sell d assets at t = 0 if they receive a negative signal at t = 0
• with probability (1 − x), sell d assets at t = 1 if the negative signal is confirmed,
else buy d assets
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where
x = 1− 1
1 + a
, and a =
( 2λ− 1
4λ(1− λ)
) 1
N−1
Proof. The proof is analogous to Proposition 20. We start with prices at t = 0,
P0 =

λH + (1− λ)L if the market maker (MM) observes at least two positive orders
λL+ (1− λ)H if the MM observes at least two negative orders
V¯ otherwise
At t = 1, once again the price depends on the history at t = 0. We get the following
cases,
• If the MM observed at least two positive orders at t = 0
P1 =

H if MM observes at least two positive orders at t = 1
L if MM observes at least two negative orders at t = 1
P0 = λH + (1− λ)L otherwise
• If the MM observed at least two negative orders at t = 0
P1 =

H if MM observes at least two positive orders at t = 1
L if MM observes at least two negative orders at t = 1
P0 = λL+ (1− λ)H otherwise
• Otherwise
P1 =

H if MM observes at least two positive orders at t = 1
L if MM observes at least two negative orders at t = 1
P0 = V¯ otherwise
Given the market maker’s beliefs (and the resulting prices), we evaluate the informed
traders strategy at t = 0. Assuming that the informed trader gets a high signal (V = H)
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Figure 1: Premature trading increases with competition (λ = 0.7)
at t = 0, his profit from trading at t = 0,
Π0 = (1− x)N−1 · 1
2
· ((λH + (1− λ)L− 1
2
(H + L)
)
=
1
2
(1− x)N−1(λ− 1
2
)(H − L)
On the other hand, if he waits to verify his signal and trades at t = 1,
Π1 = x
N−1λ(1− λ)(H − L)
Hence we have
x = 1− 1
1 + a
where a =
(
2λ−1
4λ(1−λ)
) 1
N−1
The main point to note here is that x is increasing in N as long as the initial infor-
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Figure 2: Premature trading increases with accuracy of signal (N = 3)
mation is not too accurate, i.e. λ < 1+
√
5
4
. Figure 1 shows that the premature trading
increases with the intensity of competition. Intuitively, as the number of informed agents
increases, the probability that one of them will trade early also increases, increasing
the potential loss from trading later at t = 1. On the other hand, the benefits, in the
form of verified signal, remain the same. Thus, premature trading rises with increased
competition.
Also note that x converge towards 1
2
as N goes to infinity. This is because x = 1
2
minimises the probability that informed agents trade at the same time.3 Figure 2 shows
that premature trading increases with the accuracy of the signal. This is along expected
lines since the benefits from trading late diminish as the accuracy of the signal increases.
3 1
2 achieves maximum diversification and would be the solution when there are no signal verification
benefits. However, in our case, since trading late is beneficial, as N →∞, the optimal strategy converges
to 12 , i.e. x→ 12 , but is strictly below.
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5 Implications
Propositions 19, 20 and 21 outline the trading behaviour of informed traders under
increasing levels of competition. Our results suggest that premature trading rises with
competition as informed traders find it optimal to trade prematurely. In this section,
we look at the implications of this result across three dimensions - the expected profits
of informed traders;4 the impact of premature trading on market volatility and price
discovery; and finally the behaviour of informed traders when we introduce market closing
and the window in which they can profitably trade diminishes.
5.1 Expected Profits
Using Propositions 19, 20 and 21, we can calculate the total expected profits of the
informed traders.
Proposition 22. Total expected profits are decreasing in N
Proof. We assume that the informed trader(s) receives a positive signal (the negative
signal case is analogous). Let E(Πi) be the expected profit of informed traders when the
number of informed traders is i.
One informed trader Proposition 19 implies that the informed trader will only trade
at t = 2. Furthermore, he makes a profit only when the noise trader trades against
him. Expected profit,
E(Π1) =
1
2
(H − V¯ ) = 1
4
(H − L)
Two informed traders With two informed traders, each trader has a mixed strategy
symmetric equilibrium and trades at t = 0 with probability x (Proposition 20).
The informed traders profit only when they trade in different periods and the noise
4Note that the market maker always makes zero profit in equilibrium and the noise trader trades
randomly.
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trader trades against them. The expected profit becomes,
E(Π2) =x2 · 0 + (1− x)2 · 0 + 2x(1− x)
(1
2
(λ− 1
2
)(H − L) + 1
4
(H − L)(1
2
+ 2λ(1− λ)))
=x(1− x)(H − L)(2λ− λ2 − 1
4
)
N informed traders Finally, using Proposition 21, with N informed traders, expected
profit,
E(ΠN) =
1
2
x(1− x)N−1(λ− 1
2
)(H − L) + (1− x)xN−1λ(1− λ)(H − L)
=x(1− x)(H − L)(1
2
(1− x)N−2(λ− 1
2
) + xN−2λ(1− λ)).
Since by assumption,
λ ∈ (0.5, 1], λ− λ2 ≤ 1
4
=⇒ 2λ− λ2 − 1
4
≤ 1 =⇒ x(1− x)(2λ− λ2 − 1
4
) ≤ 1
4
Since E(Π2) ≤ E(Π1), the total expected profit with two informed traders is less than
that with one informed trader.
Moreover, the total expected profit with three informed traders is
x(1− x)(H − L)(1
2
(λ− 1
2
) + λ(1− λ))
= x(1− x)(H − L)(3
2
λ− λ2 − 1
4
)
< x(1− x)(H − L)(2λ− λ2 − 1
4
)
Since E(Π3) ≤ E(Π2), the total expected profits with three informed traders are less
than that with two informed trader.
Finally, x(1 − x)(H − L)(1
2
(1 − x)N−2(λ − 1
2
) + xN−2λ(1 − λ)) is decreasing in N .
Therefore the total expected profits are decreasing with the number of traders.
Proposition 22 and Figure 3 clearly show that total expected profits are decreasing in
N . Propositions 19, 20 and 21 show that premature trading increases with competition.
As competition rises, informed traders, fearful of losing out on the trading opportunity,
trade prematurely on unverified information. This leads to lower profits in equilibrium.
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Figure 3: Expected profits are decreasing in N (λ = 0.7)
Furthermore, as competition increases, traders find it harder and harder to conceal their
identity in equilibrium. Thus the market maker can learn the informed traders informa-
tion more easily and set the price accordingly.
This result is compatible with the semi-strong form Efficient Market Hypothesis
(EMH), which suggests that market participants, trading on public information, make
zero profit in equilibrium. Intuitively, when the number of informed traders (N) is small,
the assumption of semi-strong form market efficiency is violated and market participants
make positive profits in expectation. However as N increases, we get closer to the as-
sumptions of semi-strong form market efficiency as the informed traders’ private signal
is available to larger number of market participants and as a result they can no longer
profit from their information.
5.2 Excess Volatility
Section 5.1 shows us that total expected profits decline with competition. This is along
expected lines. However, the more interesting consequence of increasing competition
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amongst market participants and the resultant premature trading is its impact on market
volatility. Here we show that increased competition leads to higher market volatility.
In the absence of competitive pressure, the informed trader would wait to verify this
signal and trade only at the end of the period. At this time, the informed trader would
have perfect information. On the other hand, with competition, the informed trader,
fearful of losing out on the trading opportunity, might decide to trade on the unverified
information prematurely at the beginning of the period. In doing so, the informed trader
would run the risk of getting the trade wrong in case the initial signal turns out to be
incorrect. This in turn would lead to higher market volatility.
Proposition 23. Competition increases market volatility.
Proof. In the absence of premature trading, i.e. one informed trader case,
since the informed trader always trades on verified information at t = 1, there is no price
movement at t = 0. When the informed trader trades at t = 1, the price movement
depends upon the actions of the noise trader. If the noise trader trades against the
informed trader, there is no price movement at t = 1. On the other hand, if the noise
trader trades in the same direction as the informed trader, price will move at t = 1.
Therefore price volatility would be
E
(
V ar(P )
)
= E
(
(P − V¯ )2)
=
1
2
(H − V¯ )2 = 1
8
(H − L)2
In the presence of premature trading, i.e. at least two informed traders,
price will move at t = 0 with probability x(1 − x) + x2 = x, and will not move with
probability 1− x. The price may then move to H or L depending on whether the signal
is correct or not. Therefore the volatility of the return will be
E [V ar(P )] = (1− x)N 1
2
(H − V¯ )2 + xN 1
2
(λH + (1− λ)L− V¯ )2
+Nx(1− x)N−1
{
1
4
(H − V¯ )2 + 1
4
[
(λH + (1− λ)L− V¯ )2 + (H − V¯ )2]}
+NxN−1(1− x)
{
1
4
(λH + (1− λ)L− V¯ )2 + 1
4
[
(λH + (1− λ)L− V¯ )2 + (H − V¯ )2]}
+
{[
1− (1− x)N −Nx(1− x)N−1 −NxN−1(1− x)− xN]
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Figure 4: Volatility is increasing in N (λ = 0.7)
× 1
2
[
(λH + (1− λ)L− V¯ )2 + (H − V¯ )2]}
=
1
2
{[
1− (1− x)N − 1
2
Nx(1− x)N−1
]
(λH + (1− λ)L− V¯ )2
+
[
1− xN − 1
2
NxN−1(1− x)
]
(H − V¯ )2
}
=
1
2
(H − L)2
{[
1− (1− x)N − 1
2
Nx(1− x)N−1
]
(λ− 1
2
)2
+
[
1− xN − 1
2
NxN−1(1− x)
]
1
4
}
Clearly, E
(
V ar(P )
)
is increasing in N .
Figure 4 shows that market volatility increases with competition. Intuitively, as the
number of informed traders increases, each trader, fearful of losing out on the trading
opportunity finds it optimal to use a mixed strategy and trade prematurely with increas-
ing probability. This increase in premature trading in turn leads to incorrect trading and
higher market volatility, hindering price discovery.
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5.3 Spike in the market closing volatility
It is widely documented that returns volatility varies systemically over the trading
day, with Wood, McInish, and Ord (1985) and Harris (1986) documenting the existence
of a distinct ‘U-shaped’ pattern in return volatility over the trading day. In particular,
these papers document spikes in market volatility as the market closing time approaches.
Our results suggest that the spike in volatility at the closing time of the market can be
modelled as a direct outcome of premature trading. Intuitively, as the market closing time
draws near, informed traders tend to overreact further in fear of not being able to use the
information at hand as the window over which they can profitably trade narrows. This
is because if informed traders wait till the next trading day, the information is revealed
to the wider market and ceases to be a profitable trading opportunity. As a result,
informed traders tend to trade even more on unverified and noisy initial information,
resulting in the spike in market volatility during the end of the trading day. Note that
our approach to the spike in the volatility at the market closing via premature trading is
different from that of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), which approaches this phenomenon
via concentrated trading arising from the strategic behaviour of noisy traders.
Formally, we extend our three-period model with two traders outlined in Section 4.2
by allowing for uncertainty of timing with respect to the arrival of unverified signal.
In particular, we now assume that the signal can arrive at t = 0 or t = 1 with equal
probability (as opposed to t = 0 with certainty in Section 4.2). The arrival of signal itself
is common knowledge, but only the informed traders can observe the signal.
As before, the signal is initially correct with probability λ and it takes one period
for informed traders to verify the signal. The asset pays off two periods after the signal
is received. We assume that the trading day starts at t = 0 and the market closes at
t = 2. In this setting, when the signal arrives at t = 0 (and can therefore be verified at
t = 1), the model remains the same as in Section 4.2. However, when the signal arrives at
t = 1, the signal can only be verified at t = 2 when the market has closed. Therefore, the
informed traders have to decide whether to trade on the information immediately or give
up on the trading opportunity. This is because if they wait until the next trading day to
verify the signal, the information is revealed to the wider market overnight and therefore
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ceases to be a profitable trading opportunity. This allows us to study the behaviour of
market participants when their window of profitable trading is curtailed.
Proposition 24. There exists a unique symmetric PBE, such that the informed traders
will
• act exactly as describe in Proposition 20 if they receive a signal at t = 0
• trade according to the signal with probability 1 if they receive a signal at t = 1
Proof. If the signal arrives at t = 0, the proof is identical to that of Proposition 20. On
the other hand, if the signal arrives at t = 1, it is straightforward to show that the only
symmetric equilibrium is to trade immediately on the unverified information, given that
the informed traders cannot profit at all at t = 2 when the information is revealed.
Since there is no volatility in the absence of price movement, we focus on the prema-
ture trading with price impact. Because the signal arrives at t = 0 with 1/2 probability,
the probability of premature trading with price impact at t = 0 is 1
2
[x(1− x) + x2] = x
2
.
On the other hand, the probability of premature trading with price impact at t = 1 is
1
2
. Therefore, when the arrival time of the signal is uncertain, traders are more likely to
trade prematurely based on a wrong signal at the market closing, resulting in a spike in
volatility.
6 Conclusion
We develop a model of trading under competition. In our setup, informed traders
receive an initial noisy signal, which they need to verify. They can do this costlessly
by waiting for one period. Our model shows that with competition, informed traders,
fearful of losing out on the trading opportunity, may choose not to verify their signal
and instead trade prematurely. This premature trading takes place in a completely
rational REE framework and is a direct result of competition. Our results show that this
premature trading increases with competition.
We go on to look at the impact of such premature trading. We show that not only
does this lead to lower overall profits in equilibrium, but also results in higher market
122
volatility. We believe that our model can shed some light on the widely documented
excess volatility puzzle in financial markets. Our model also suggests that the strong
evidence suggesting that market volatility spikes as the market closing time approaches
may also be a consequence of premature trading.
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A Robustness Check
Alternative Information Structure: Aggregate Order Flow
While the setup of our model closely resembles Kyle (1985), the information structure
in our model differs slightly by assuming that the market maker observes every order,
but cannot distinguish between noise and informed traders. In the Kyle (1985) model,
the market maker only observes aggregate order flow. In this appendix, we check the ro-
bustness of our results by assuming an alternative Kyle (1985) type information structure
with aggregate order flows.
The setup of our model remains the same as outlined in section 3. The only difference
is that now the market maker only observes the aggregate order flow. In making this
assumption, we restrict the information set of the market maker. For example, in our
original setup, the market maker could distinguish between an order {d, d, -d} and {d}.
However, with the aggregate order flow setting of the Kyle (1985) model, the market
maker would observe the same aggregate demand, +d.
While this makes our model more complicated, our core result go through. Proposition
19 and its proof remains the same as the information structure is identical in the two cases.
We therefore omit it from the appendix. The core result of Proposition 20, premature
trading, continues to hold, but the informed traders strategy is more complicated. This is
because now the market maker has less information and the informed traders information
is revealed more slowly. Proposition 20 now becomes,
Proposition 25. There exists a unique symmetric PBE, such that the informed traders
will
• with probability x, buy d assets at t = 0 if they receive a positive signal at t = 0
• with probability (1−x), buy d assets at t = 1 if the positive signal is confirmed, else
sell d assets
• with probability x, sell d assets at t = 0 if they receive a negative signal at t = 0
• with probability (1 − x), sell d assets at t = 1 if the negative signal is confirmed,
else buy d assets
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where x is the mixed strategy (symmetric) equilibrium defined by
(1− x)2
x2 + 2(1− x)2 (λ−
1
2
) =
x
2
[ −λ2 + λ
x2 + (1− x)2 +
1
4
]
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that the informed traders receive a high signal
SH at t = 0. The market maker observes aggregate demand and sets the price. For
notational simplicity, let V H = λH + (1− λ)L and V L = λL+ (1− λ)H.
At t = 0,
P0 =

V H if D0 = 3d
V H if D0 = 2d
x2
x2+2(1−x2)V
H + 2(1−x
2)
x2+2(1−x2) V¯ if D0 = d
V¯ if D0 = 0
x2
x2+2(1−x2)V
L + 2(1−x
2)
x2+2(1−x2) V¯ if D0 = −d
V L if D0 = −2d
V L if D0 = −3d
In setting the price at t = 1, the market maker takes into account demand at t = 0.
However, the market maker’s information set is now smaller.
• If D0 = 3d
P1 = P0 = V
H
• If D0 = 2d
P1 =

H if D1 = 2d
P0 = V
H if D1 = 0
L if D1 = −2d
• If D0 = 0
P1 =

H if D1 = 2d
V¯ if D1 = 0
L if D1 = −2d
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• If D0 = −2d
P1 =

H if D1 = 2d
P0 = V
L if D1 = 0
L if D1 = −2d
• If D0 = d
P1 =

H if D1 = 3d
H if D1 = 2d
x2
x2+(1−x2)V
H + (1−x
2)
x2+(1−x2)H if D1 = d
P0 =
x2
x2+2(1−x2)V
H + 2(1−x
2)
x2+2(1−x2) V¯ if D1 = 0
x2
x2+(1−x2)V
H + (1−x
2)
x2+(1−x2)L if D1 = −d
L if D1 = −2d
L if D1 = −3d
• If D0 = −d
P1 =

H if D1 = 3d
H if D1 = 2d
x2
x2+(1−x2)V
H + (1−x
2)
x2+(1−x2)H if D1 = d
P0 =
x2
x2+2(1−x2)V
H + 2(1−x
2)
x2+2(1−x2) V¯ if D1 = 0
x2
x2+(1−x2)V
H + (1−x
2)
x2+(1−x2)L if D1 = −d
L if D1 = −2d
L if D1 = −3d
• If D0 = −3d
P1 = P0 = λL+ (1− λ)H
Given the market maker’s beliefs (and the resulting prices), we evaluate the informed
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traders profits at t = 0 and t = 1.
Π0 = x
1
2
(
V H −
[
x2
x2 + 2(1− x)2V
H +
2(1− x)2
x2 + 2(1− x)2 V¯
])
+(1− x)1
2
(V H − V¯ )
Using the expression for P0, it is clear that the informed trader makes non-zero profit in
only two cases - when the other informed trader also trades in the first period, the noise
trader trades against both the informed traders (D0 = d); and when the other informed
trader trades at t = 1 and the noise trader trades against the informed trader (D0 = 0).
In all other cases, the informed trader makes 0 profit.
Π1 = xλ
1
2
(
H − 1
2
(
V¯ + V H
))
+x (1− λ) 1
2
(
1
2
(
V¯ + V H
)− L)
+ (1− x)λ1
2
(
H −
[
x2
x2 + (1− x)2V
H +
(1− x)2
x2 + (1− x)2H
])
+ (1− x) (1− λ) 1
2
([
x2
x2 + (1− x)2V
H +
(1− x)2
x2 + (1− x)2L
]
− L
)
Here the first line represents the case where the signal turns out to be correct, the
other informed trader trades in the first period and the noise trader trades against the
informed trader of interest in the second period. The second line represents the case
where everything is the same except that the information turns out to be wrong in the
second period. The third line represents the case where the information is correct, the
other informed trader trades in the second period and the noise trader trades against
both the informed traders and the fourth line represents the case where everything is the
same except that the information turns out to be wrong in the second place. Π0 can be
simplified as
Π0 =
(1− x)2
x2 + 2(1− x)2 (λ−
1
2
) (H − L) ,
133
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Accuracy of Initial Signal (λ)
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 P
re
m
at
ur
e 
Tr
ad
in
g 
(x
)
Figure 5: Numerical solution for different values of λ
Also, Π1 can be simplified as
Π1 =
x
2
[ −λ2 + λ
x2 + (1− x)2 +
1
4
]
(H − L) .
Since the equilibrium condition, Π0 = Π1 leads to the following high order polynomial
equation (1), the closed form solution for the mixed strategy, x is not obtainable. Rather,
we turn to seeking for the numerical solution.
(1− x)2
x2 + 2(1− x)2 (λ−
1
2
) =
x
2
[ −λ2 + λ
x2 + (1− x)2 +
1
4
]
(1)
Figure 5 shows that even under the new set of assumptions, once competition is intro-
duced, informed traders find it optimal to trade early. Thus our main result, premature
trading, continues to hold and as before, premature trading increases with λ. The intu-
ition behind this result remains the same, however note that x no longer converges to 1
2
.
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This is because under these new set of assumptions, the market maker’s information set
is smaller and thus informed traders gain more from trading early as it is less likely that
the market maker will be able to identify them.
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